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INNOCENT VICTIMS AND BLIND JUSTICE:
CHILDRENS' RIGHTS TO BE FREE
FROM CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive problems in the United States
is sexual child abuse.' An increasing number of sexual abuse
1. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform, 42 U.S.C.A. §
5102 (Supp. 1988), defines sexual abuse as:
(i) the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion
of any child to engage in, or having a child assist any other person to
engage in, any sexually explicit conduct (or any simulation of such
conduct) for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct, or (ii) the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other such form
of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with child, under
circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed
or threatened thereby, as determined in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary; and (B) For the purpose of this clause, the
term "child" or "children" means any individual who has not or
individuals who have not attained the age of eighteen.
Id.
The National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect defines child sexual abuse as
"[c]ontacts or interactions between a child and an adult when the child is being used as an
object of gratification for adult sexual needs or desires." HHS Sexual Abuse of Children:
Selected Readings I (1980) (quoted in Note, The Unreliabiliy Of Expert Testimony On The
Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEo. LJ. 429, 429 (1985)). While states
may have different statutory definitions of sexual abuse, most remain considerably similar to
the definitions mentioned above. Cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1987) which provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of sexual abuse of children if he
knowingly: (a) employs, uses, or permits the employment or use of a
child in an exhibition of sexual contact, actual or simulated: (b)
photographs, films, videotapes, or records a child engaging in sexual
contact, actual or simulated: (c) persuades, entices, counsels, or procures
a child to engage in sexual contact, actual or simulated, for use as
designated in (1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(d); (d) processes, develops, prints,
publishes, transports, distributes, sells, possesses with intent to sell,
exhibits, or advertises material consisting of or concluding a photograph,
photographic negative, undeveloped film, video-tape, or recording
representing a child engaging in sexual contact, actual or simulated; or
(e) finances any of the activities described in subsections (1)(a) through
(1)(d) knowing that the activity is the nature described in those sub-
sections.
(2) A person convicted of the offense of sexual abuse children shall be
fined not to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned in the state prison for any
term not to exceed 20 years, or both.
(3) For the purposes of this section, "child" means any person less than
16 years old.
Id. 1988 CAL. STAT. 288 provides:
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Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious
act including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in
Part 1 of this code upon or with the body, or any part or member
thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such
person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
imprisoned in the state prison for a term of three, six, or eight years.
Id KAN. STAT. ANN. § 15.900 (1985) provides:
(2) Child sexual abuse and exploitation means harm to a child's health
or welfare by any person, responsible or not for the child's health or
welfare, which harm, occurs or is threatened through non-accidental
sexual contact . ...
Id WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (1986) provides:
(12) "Child abuse or neglect" shall mean the injury, sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, or neglect treatment or maltreatment of a child by any
person under circumstances which indicate that the child's health, welfare,
and safety is harmed thereby. An abused child is a child who has been
subjected to child abuse o- neglect as defined herein: PROVIDED, That
this sub-section shall not be construed to authorize interference with
child-raising practices,including reasonable parental discipline, which are
not proved to be injurious to the child's health, welfare, and safety.
Id The American Humane Association, Denver Research Institute, and the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect Analysis of Official Child Neglect and Abuse Reporting, 1979
(1981) (cited in Davis, Child Abuse: A Pervasive Problem of the 80's, 61 N.D.L. REV. 195,
198-200 (1985)) reports that out of 711,142 cases of abuse and neglect throughout the nation
and its territories, 5.76% involved sexual maltreatment. Sexual maltreatment includes "[tihe
involvement of a child in any sexual act or situation, the purposes of which is to provide
sexual gratification or financial benefit to the perpetrator, all sexual activity between an adult
and a child is considered as sexual maltreatment." Id.
The Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (1983) defines child
abuse and neglect as:
The physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent
treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen, or the
age specified by the child protection law of the State in question, by a
person who is responsible in the child's health or welfare under
circumstances which indicate that the child's welfare is harmed or
threatened thereby, as determined in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary.
Id Cf. N.Y. FAM. CT Acr § 1012(e) (McKinney 1983) which provides:
(e) "Abused child" means a child less than eighteen years of age whose
parent or other person legally responsible for his care...
(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by
other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk
of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment
of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ, or
(ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury
to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to
cause death or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted loss
or impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or
(iii) commits, or allows to be committed, a sex offense against such child,
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cases are being reported each year While sexual abuse is
not a new phenomenon to American society, the actual scope
of the problem is just being realized? Studies have shown
that the sexual abuse of children is closely linked to the home
environment with the majority of the acts of abuse being
committed by fathers and stepfathers.' The victims are mostly
children' of tender years6 ranging in age from two months old
as defined in the penal law, provided, however, that the corroboration
requirements contained therein shall not apply to proceedings under this
article.
Id
2. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect estimates over a 100% increase
in sexual abuse reports since 1976. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, at 16, col. 1. Moreover, more
than 100,000 incidents of sexual abuse occur each year. Id. In 1971, it was estimated that
approximately 500,000 cases of abuse (sexual, physical, emotional) occurred annually
throughout the nation. Id. In 1989, almost 100,000 incidents of chils abuse or neglect were
reported in New York City. Gallet, Judicial Management of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 23
FAMILY L.Q., Fall 1989, at 477 [hereinafter Gallet].
3. In the early 1970's sexual abuse was regarded as a relatively uncommon problem.
Finkelhor, Sexual Abuse: A Sociological Perspective, 6 INT'L. J. OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
95 (1982) [hereinafter Finkelhorl. Starting in the late 1970's, reports of abuse began to
flourish at a rapid rate and have continued to rise. Id. at 95. The actual number of reported
cases, however, constitutes only a fraction of the total number of actual incidents of sexual
abuse that occur each year. Id. It has been suggested that changes in sexual behavior,
religious beliefs, and the erosion of social norms that used to be associated with the
traditional concept of the family have been among the principal causes of the recent
acknowledgement of the existence of child sexual abuse. Id. at 96-97. "In part because
society has for so long refused to recognize intrafamily child sexual abuse as an issue, and
in part because of the continued popular characterization of the perpetrators as 'dirty old
men in the alley,' many cases of child sexual abuse are often missed or discounted." Wells,
Expert Testimony To Admit of Not To Admit, 57 FLA. BAR. J. 672, 673 (Dec. 1983).
4. Historically, many people believed that strangers posed the greatest danger to children.
However, recent reports conclude that most of the abuse occurs within the family, often by
fathers and stepfathers. See Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 96. Clinical studies now show that
approximately 90% of the perpetrators are fathers, regardless of whether the child is a boy
or girl. No child, including an infant, is too young to be sexually abused. BESHAROV,
PROVING CHILD ABUSE, A GUIDE FOR PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW YORK FAMILY COURT ACT
51 (1984) [hereinafter BESHAROVJ. The largest percentage of reported incest occurs between
fathers and daughters. J. BULKLEY, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, A.B.A. NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 172 (1984) [hereinafter
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE).
5. COHEN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 12 (1986) [hereinafter COHEN]. See, e.g., State
in Interest of J.D., 494 So. 2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986) (child victim two years-old); Myers v.
Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987) (youngest victim age two); Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1987) (abuse began when child was six years-old).
6. Michigan developed a tender years doctrine which allowed a child of tender years'
detailed complaint to be admitted into evidence through a third party's testimony. Note, A
Tender Years Doctrine for the Juvenile Courts: An Effective Way to Protect the Sexually Abused
Child, 61 U. DET. J. URBAN LAw 249, 250 (1983-84). This doctrine was abolished by People
v. Kreiner, 415 Mich. 372, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982).
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to eighteen years of age.7 Furthermore, the abuse cuts across
all social and economic backgrounds
Recently, the criminal justice system has been inundated
with cases involving child sexual abuse and the delicate nature
of the subject makes prosecutions extremely difficult. The
victims are children who are either reluctant or unable to
testify,9 normally no eye witnesses are available," and usually
no distinct signs of abuse are present." To combat this
7. See supra note 5.
8. GALLAGHER and DODDS, SPEAKING OUT, FIGHTING BACK: PERSONAL EXPERIENCES
OF WOMEN WHO SURVIVED CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE HOME 171 (1985) [hereinafter
GALLAGHER]. See generally COHEN, supra note 5.
9. Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (1983) (hereinafter Yunl (citing Libai, The Protection of The
Child Victim Of A Sexual Offense In The Criminal Justice System, in THE SEXUAL
ViCTMOLOGY OF YOUTH 187, 233 (I. Schultz ed. 1980)). For older children who are more
able to understand the difficulties inherent in the prosecution of the offenders, their
unwillingness to go forward with the prosecution is justified. One study of sexual assault
cases revealed that 60% of the cases actually went to court. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin,
Nov. 7, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Out of this 60%, the children had to make an average of seven
courtroom appearances. Id.
10. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 321.
11. Force is not usually used in child sexual abuse incidents. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE,
supra note 4, at 171. This is due in part to the strong psychological power the abusive parent
has over the child. Id. Delayed reporting of sex abuse incidents also decreases the medical
evidence. Id. Elements constituting proof of child abuse include:
Direct Proof
1. Is there an eyewitness to the parents' alleged abuse? Is there any
reason why the witness should not testify?
2. Can the child testify about the alleged abuse?
3. Is there a prior statement by the child that should be introduced?
And, can it be corroborated?
4. Did the parents make an inculpatory statement?
Circumstantial Proof of Physical Abuse
1. Did the child have apparently inflicted injuries?
2. Was the child in the parents' general custody during the relevant
time?
3. Did the parents fail to explain how the child received the injuries?
Or, was the explanation illogical, contradictory, or at variance with the
child's injuries?
4. Does the behavior of the child or of the parents provide support for
a finding that the injuries were inflicted?
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problem, some courts are allowing expert testimony to
establish that the child suffers from "Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome."2
Circumstantial Proof of Sexual Abuse
1. Did the child's body show signs of a violent sexual assault?
2. Is there circumstantial evidence of sexual activity? If so, does the
totality of the circumstances make it unlikely that the child was engaged
in voluntary sexual activity with a peer?
3. Was the child in the parents' general custody during the relevant
time?
4. Did the parents fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of the child's
condition?
5. Does the behavior of the child or of the parents suggest parental
involvement in the child's apparent sexual activity?
BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 57. Compare this with circumstantial evidence of sexual activity:
CAVEAT: The following physical conditions indicate sexual activity.
Whether they are prima facie evidence of sexual abuse depends on the
child's apparent maturity and social situation, as well as the statements
of the child and the parents.
1. Underclothing that is torn, blood stained, or showing signs of semen.
2. The presence of semen in oral, anal, or vaginal areas.
3. The presence of foreign objects in rectal or vaginal cavities.
4. Vaginas that are torn, lacerated, infected, or bloody (as well as broken
hymens).
5. Penises or scrotums that are swollen, inflamed, infected, or showing
signs of internal bleeding.
6. Bite marks on or around genitalia.
7. Anal areas that are swollen, torn, lacerated, infected, or that have
very lax muscle tone suggestive of internal stretching.
8. Mutilation of sexual organs, or other parts of the body.
9. Venereal diseases in oral, anal, and urogenital areas (especially in
pre-pubescent children).
10. Unusual vaginal or urethral discharges.
11. Repeated cystitis, especially in pre-pubescent girls.
12. Pregnancy, especially in early adolescence.
Id. at 51. In extremely young children, signs of sexual involvement, such as the ones outlined
above, constitute prirnw facie evidence of sexual abuse for the reason that children of this age
are deemed unaware of such activity.
12. Comment, The Admissibility of "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in
California Criminal Courts, 17 PAC. L.J. 1361 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, CSAAS]. CSAAS
was originally developed to provide an explanation for the child victim's peculiar behavior and
to help diagnose and treat the victims. Id. at 1367. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 7 INTL J. OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr 177 (1983). The
elements of CSAAS are secrecy, helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed
disclosure, and retraction. Id. at 181. Although the first two elements are not caused by
sexual abuse, the remaining three elements are a direct result of the abuse. Moreover,
CSAAS is used primarily in cases where the sexual abuse is committed by a family member,
relative, or trusted friend because such sexual abuse usually does not leave physical scars or
outward signs, but rather emotional and psychological scars. Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 96
(sexual abuse leaves substantial psychological scars on its victims). See also Levy, Using
"Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAMILY L.Q. 383, 393-95 (1989). Dr.
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Further, in order to avoid evidentiary problems,
prosecutors are -increasingly relying on expert testimony.3
Astrid Heger, Director of the Child Sexual Abuse Program at the University of Southern
California, reports that the abuse usually entails touching, fondling, mutual masturbation and
oral sex. Jacobbi & Wright, Mothers Who Go To Jail For Their Children, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1988, at 158.
Specifically, in infancy the child exhibits fretfulness, feeding disturbances,
impairment of the ability to trust and impairment of developing pride.
In childhood, there is thumb sucking or nail biting, fear, enuresis conduct
problems, anxiety-provoking fantasies about sex, excessive masturbation,
psychosomatic disorders, and acting "seductively" with all members of the
opposite sex.
Id. Mele, Major Evidentiary Issues in Prosecutions of Family Abuse Cases, 11 OHIO N.U.L.
REv. 245, 252 (1984) [hereinafter Mele]. Different behavioral signs also exist and are
associated with sexual abuse:
CAVEAT: The following behavioral clues are not conclusive reason, in
themselves, for a finding. Rather, they can be used to help assess the
significance of signs of sexual activity found on the child's body:
1. Unwillingness to disrobe in the presence of others (e.g., unwillingness
to change for gym class).
2. Excessive fear of being approached or touched by persons of the
opposite sex.
3. Fear of going home.
4. Running away from home.
5. Adolescent prostitution.
6. Sexual behavior or references that are bizarre or unusual for the
child's age.
7. Sexual knowledge that is too sophisticated for the child's age.
8. Seductiveness which is not age appropriate.
9. Behavior that is withdrawn, infantile, or filled with fantasy (the child
may even appear to be retarded).
10. Attempted suicide.
11. Dramatic changes in behavior or school performance.
12. Unusual accumulations of money or candy.
13. Indirect allusions: A sexually abused child may seek out a special
friend or a teacher to confide in. These confidences may frequently
be vague and indirect, such as "I'm afraid to go home tonight," "I'd
like to come and live with you," or "I want to live in a foster home."
BESHAROV, supra note 4, at 52 (quoted in BEsHAROV, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE 1984)).
Conversely, sexual abuse by a stranger is often accompanied by a violent assault. Due to
the inherent differences in the scars left on the victim, expert testimony about CSAAS should
not be required in all cases of child sexual abuse, but limited to those instances when the
perpetrator is a family member, relative, or trusted friend, and the abuse occurred in a
nonviolent manner. Comment, CSAAS, supra note 12, at 1389-90. See also People v. Payan,
173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (2d Dist. Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (expert testimony
regarding CSAAS admissible); Matter of Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr.
789 (2d Dist. Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (psychiatrist's opinion that three year-old suffered from
sexual abuse admissible).
13. See People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (2d Dist. Cal.
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); State v. Kim, 64
Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); Commonwealth v. Stago, 267 Pa. Super. 90, 406 A.2d 533
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Additionally, a number of states have recently adopted
legislative reforms " to the hearsay exception,"S the delineation
of corroboration requirements, 6 and the admission of the child
victims' testimony." While these reforms are contributing to
an increase in the number of convictions 8 for sexual abuse,
offenders are still not being convicted even when the evidence
supports the allegations of sexual abuse. This failure to
convict can be attributed, at least in part, to the strict
evidentiary requirements for these types of cases. In most
instances, then, the offenders are not convicted, they continue
to have access to their children and often the sexual abuse
continues. A majority of these cases deal specifically with
fathers who are alleged to have sexually abused their children
or step-children during visitation periods. In a majority of
these cases, the evidence, which consists mainly of the child's
out-of-court statements, supports the allegations against their
fathers. However, absent a strong finding of sexual abuse the
courts are often unwilling to terminate the father's visitation
rights. 9 Usually, second proceedings are held after the family
court hearing to determine whether the father's visitation
rights should be discontinued. Moreover, cases involving the
termination of parental rights are now subjected to a clear and
convincing standard of proof,' whereas, during abuse
proceedings, the burden of proving sexual abuse is by a
(1979).
14. Legislative reforms in the area of child abuse serve three purposes, (1) to modify
legal procedures to make them more sensitive to child victims, (2) to improve prosecution
and conviction rates, (3) to provide treatment programs for the offender, the child, and the
family. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging
Legal Issues in Child Serual Abuse Cases, 89 DicK. L. REV. 645, 645 (1984).
15. The following states have enacted special hearsay exception statutes: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. For details
see infra notes 210-46 and accompanying text and Appendix.
16. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 210-46 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g, infra note 270 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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preponderance of the evidence, an easier burden for the
prosecution."' The prosection is faced with a second trial
using the identical evidence used in the family court
proceedings, but must subject it to a higher evidentiary
standard. In far too many instances, the child remains a
potential victim of abuse as the father's visitation privileges
remain intact, the sexual abuse continues, and if the
prosecution continues with the second trial, the child will once
again have to testify.
This note will examine child sexuial abuse committed by
male abusers, followed by a specific examination of the
reluctance of courts across the nation to terminate a father's
visitation rights in child sexual abuse cases upon a showing of
abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Alternative
standards and rules are necessary to insure that the victim's
rights are fully protected. Part II will develop the history of
child sexual abuse. Part III will examine evidentiary
requirements and their relationship to the dearth of knowledge
possessed by some courts hearing abuse cases, along with the
inadequacy of the system to effectively deal with an increasing
overflow of sexual abuse cases. Specifically, Section A
discusses corroboration and the child victim as a witness.
Section B addresses current hearsay exceptions applicable to
child sexual abuse. Subdivision (B)(1) focuses on the relevant
background law and (B)(2) on the mother's and expert
witnesses' testimony. Subdivision (B)(3) addresses current
legislative developments regarding hearsay. Section C
addresses the doctrine of excited utterance. Part IV addresses
the termination of a father's parental rights. Finally, Part V
will propose standards and guidelines which would allow for
a greater conviction rate for sex abuse crimes and termination
of a father's visitation rights while not infringing on the
father's constitutional right to due process.
21. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
Proof of the existence of the sexual abuse of children has
been present throughout human history.' In Greece, during
the fourth century B.C., children were subjected to ritual
sacrifices, harsh treatment, exploitation, and abandonment.'
Evidence of child abuse, both physical and sexual, also
appeared in the Rome, Scandinavian cultures, England, India
and China. 4 Perhaps the earliest court case involving child
abuse took place in 1655.' In one such case, the master was
"burned in the hand" for the severe abuse and manslaughter
of his child servant.?
During the eighteenth century, parents were rarely held
liable for abusing their children. Under the common law,
parents could be held civilly liable only for the excessive
punishment of children. Furthermore, in criminal
prosecutions, parents would only be held liable when the
punishment was viewed as grossly unreasonable, cruel and
merciless, or when the child was permanently injured.' In
keeping with the traditional moral and social values of the
time in general and particularly the societal views of the
autonomy of the family unit, it was inconceivable that a child
22. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Pan 1: Historical Overview, Legal Mai* and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 293 (1972) [hereinafter Overview].
23. Id. at 294.
24. Id. at 295-300.
25. See I Children and Youth 123-24.
26. Id.
27. Overview, supra note 22, at 304.
28. The courts usually presumed the reasonableness of the parents' actions. Additionally,
it was believed that parents, as central authority figures, should maintain control over their
children. Because very few laws offered protection for the children, the abuse continued. Id.
at 304-05. The first child saving efforts were launched by a private corporation in New York
which opened the New York House of Refuge in 1825. Many other cities began to open
similar institutions which housed abused, abandoned and neglected children who were placed
there by their parents or the courts. Id. at 306. Today, punishments for child sexual abuse
vary from state to state. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 4, at 9. A detailed listing of each
states' punishments is available. Id. at 21-51.
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could ever be sexually abused by a family member.' Many
believed that threats of sexual abuse came solely from
strangers outside the family." Because of such mistaken
beliefs, as well as the lack of support services and protection
for the child victims, almost all incidents went unreported.
It was not until the 1960's that formal protection of
abused children began to take form.31 In the mid 1970's the
first concerted efforts on behalf of sexually abused children
were initiated32 and in the 1980's, the number of reported
cases steadily increased.33
Since the 1970's, attitudes and perceptions toward the
sexual abuse of children have shifted drastically from
traditional beliefs.' Presently, nationwide acknowledgment of
child sexual abuse exists and it is considered one of the most
heinous acts that can occur between parent and child.35 These
societal views have resulted in increased pressure on state
legislatures for intervention. In working to achieve the
ultimate goal of protecting children from abuse, a delicate
balance must be reached between intervention to protect the
children and the heavily valued belief in the family autonomy.
The paramount concern in all child sexual abuse cases is, and
29. It was virtually unacceptable to entertain the idea that parents whom children loved
and turned to for protection could ever abuse their own children. This accounts for'the
suppression of the unthinkable notion that a parent might be the perpetrator. Overview,
supra note 22, at 293.
30. Finkelhor, supra note 3, at 96.
31. In the 1960's public social agencies were authorized to protect physically abused
and neglected children through their child protective service staffs. Johnson, Child Sexual
Abuse: Case Handling Through Public Social Agencies in the Southeast of the USA, 5 INrL J.
OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 123, 123 (1981).
32. See generally In re Armentrout, 207 Kan. 366, 485 P.2d 183 (1971); In re Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, 499 Pa. 543, 297 A.2d 117 (1972); In re Van Vlack, 81 Cal.
App. 2d 838, 185 P.2d 346 (1947). An increase in the number of cases has also occurred
since 1970. GALLAGHER, supra note 8, preface. ,
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Endangered Children- A Proposed Legal Response,
6 INTL J. OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 16, 16 (1982).
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should remain, the safety and well-being of the child.'
Adding to the intricacies of sexual abuse cases,
allegations of abuse must meet the fair preponderance
standard.37 In Matter of Nicole V.,' the court confirmed that
findings of child abuse need only be based on a
preponderance of the evidence,3 as criminal sanctions are not
imposed and permanent termination of parental rights does
not occur at such proceedings.' Further, no violation of due
process exists by using this standard. On the other hand, in
light of a recent United States Supreme Court decision,"
proceedings to terminate parental rights require clear and
convincing evidence."
HI. EvlDENIIARY ROuumENT
A. The Child Victim's Testimony and Corroboration
36. Id. See also Matter of Erin G., 139 A.D.2d 737, 527 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't 1988)
(finding of abuse was sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence); Matter of Tammie
Z., 66 N.Y.2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 1038, 494 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1985). N.Y. FAMILY COURT Acr §
1046 (b)(i) (McKinney 1983) provides "[alny determination that the child is an abused or
neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." Id. Abuse proceedings
in Family Court do not lead to any type of criminal penalties against the parent. CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 4, at 193.
37. This standard is defined as proof which leads the jury to find that the existence of
the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Cleary, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. A preponderance of the evidence
may not be determined by the number of witnesses, but by the greater weight of all the
evidence including number of witnesses, opportunity for knowledge, information possessed,
and manner of testifying. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (5th ed. 1979). "Fair
preponderance of evidence" is defined as "[elvidence sufficient to create in the minds of the
triers of fact the conviction that the party upon whom.is the burden has established its case.
The greater and weightier evidence, the more convincing evidence." Id. at 538.
38. 123 A.D.2d 97, 510 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't 1987).
39. Id. at 101, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 570. In New York, "lolnce it has been established tha
the child has been abused, even if there has been no evidence that the parent is the abuser,
the burden shifts to the parent to prove lack off culpability." Gallet, supra note 2, at 478.
40. See supra note 36.
41. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
42. Id. at 747-48. See also infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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In most cases, the child must testify and there is little
or no corroborative43 evidence" because generally there are no
eye witnesses to the abuse committed by a father upon his
child." Due to the small amount of credence given to the
child's story and the nature of the offense, child victims find
themselves confined within the secrecy of the crime.' Adding
to these pre-existing complications is the delay in reporting the
offense which increases the difficulty of prosecuting the case.
Delays in reporting occur for the obvious reason that most
perpetrators threaten their victims with retaliation for telling
anyone about the incident. In a child's mind, these threats of
possible physical violence are enormous and the emotional,
along with the psychological trauma of relating the incident to
anyone, including a family member, is thereby increased.
Further, most children have extreme difficulty testifying in
court. Problems arise not only with the age of the witness,
7
but also with the delicacy of their emotional state. Under the
43. Corroboration is defined as:
To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional and
confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a witness is said to be
corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the representation of
some other witnesses, or to comport with some facts otherwise known or
established.
BLACKS LAW DICrnONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979). The Washington court of appeals defined
corroborative evidence as "[alny evidence, outside of the complainant's testimony itself, which
has probative value - any evidence which could convince the trier of fact that the crime was
committed,... and which tends to connect the defendant with the crime." State v. Jones,
50 Wash. App. 709, 711, 750 P.2d 281, 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). Cf. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1-102 (1987) which defines corroborative evidence as "additional evidence of a different
character to the same point."
44. McGrath and Clemens, The Child Victim as a Winess in Sexual Abuse Cases, MONT.
L. REV. 229, 230 (1985) [hereinafter McGrath].
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46. See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.
47. The extremely young child victim presents other special problems as a
witness. The problems may arise either from disqualification because of
age or other infirmity or the child's refusal to testify out of fear, shyness,
or trauma. The latter is especially problematic if the offender is a parent
or a member of the victim's household, as there is often subtle pressure
placed on the children not to testify.
McGrath, supra note 44, at 231 (quoted in Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, Epert Testimony on
the Dynamics of Intra Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAw 166 (4th ed. 1983)).
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Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform
Act,48 a "child" is defined as a person under eighteen. '9
Although this is the general age limit for "children," age limits
among the states vary."0 Gail Goodman, Director of the
Psychology and Law Program at the University of Denver,
argues that children eight years of age and older have the
ability to relate the details of an experience in a straight
forward manner, but children seven and under usually have
difficulties."1
Because of the scarcity of other types of evidence, the
child's courtroom experience increases in importance and
should be made as painless as possible." To accomplish this
goal, prosecutors should be aware of necessary steps which
should be taken to allow the story to be retold, while, at the
same time protecting the child from further emotional
trauma."
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (Supp. 1988).
49. See supra note 1.
50. In Montana, a child is any person under sixteen years of age. MONT. CODE ANN.
45-5-632 (1987). In New York, an abused child is a person under eighteen years of age.
N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 1012(e) (McKinney 1983).
51. Would a Kid Lie? and When Kids Testify, 71 A.B.A. J. 17, 17-18 (Feb. 1985).
52. Id. at 18. But see Slicker, Child Sex Abuse: The Innocent Accused, 91 CASE &
COMMENT, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 12. While the author sets forth the proposition that childrens'
statement are not that reliable, research indicates otherwise. See infra notes 109, 110 and
accompanying text. One study revealed that very young children may have an ability to recall
that is superior to adults. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Nov. 7, 1984, at 3, col. 2. Dr. Mary
Ann Foley, Psychologist at Nazareth College, also found that when comparing six year old
children to adults, children were no worse in distinguishing real and imagined events. Id at
8, col. 1. Recently, researchers have studied and developed data on how children compare
to adult witnesses. Penrod, Bull & Lengnick, Children as Observers and Witnesses: The
Empirical Data, 23 FAMILY L.Q., Fall 1989, at 411-31.
53. Gail Goodman, University of Denver, Donald Boss with the Kempe National Center
in Denver, and Jonathan Horowitz of Carney Hospital in Boston have researched methods
of dealing with young witnesses:
1. If possible, have a child psychologist or other trained person do the
first interview. Often police and lawyers do not know how to talk with
children and so may not get the best from them. Try to reduce the
number of times a child is asked to recount the experience. An accurate
and complete first interview is crucial. Use videotape if possible.
2. When questioning or cross-examining a child in court, do not ask
leading questions, cross-examination techniques used by lawyers are
generally designed for adults, but children must be handled differently.
1990] NOTE 227
When a child is going to be a witness, competency must
be established. In Wyoming, courts dealing with this issue
make sure that the following five elements are present: (1) the
child witness must demonstrate an understanding of the
obligation to tell the truth; 4 (2) the court must have an
accurate impression of the child's mental capacity at the time
of the occurrence which he is to testify about;55 (3) the child's
memory must be demonstrably sufficient to retain an
independent recollection; 6  (4) the child must have the
capacity to express in words the memory of the occurrence;"
and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it. 8
Similar provisions exist in the other states regarding
competency of child witnesses."
Although a child may testify, it is widely believed,
especially by prosecutors, that corroboration is essential to
obtaining a conviction.' Without corroboration, hearsay
3. Explain to the child what will happen during the trial. Take the
child to the courtroom before the trial. Let the child meet the judge
and other courtroom personnel.
4. If the child is particularly young and frightened, let him or her sit
on the lap of a parent or other adult during testimony.
Id





59. Montana requires that a factual determination be made as to whether the child
qualifies to testify. Even if the child can tell the difference between the truth and a lie, if
he/she is incapable of relating the details of the offense so that he/she would be understood
by the judge and jury, the child could be found incompetent to testify. McGrath, supra note
44, it 231-32; State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 242, 700 P.2d 630, 636 (1985). In New York,
children under twelve years of age are not allowed to testify under oath unless the judge is
satisfied that the child understands the oath. N.Y. CRIM. PROC LAW § 60.20(2) (McKinney
1981); N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1. This section of the C.P.L. creates a rebuttable
presumption that all children under the age of twelve are incompetent to testify. To
overcome this presumption, the child must show an understanding of the oath and intelligence
sufficient to allow his testimony to be received. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 2, col. 1; see also
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
60. In 1981, New York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia were the only three
jurisdictions maintaining a corroboration requirement for child sex crimes. In 1985 these
requirements were eliminated. Bulkley, Introduction: Background and Overview of Child
Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MiAMI L REV. 5, 7 (1985). Further support for the necessity of
228 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. VII
statements form the bulk of the case against the offender. If
corroborative evidence is available, the prosecution, as well as
the court, can be more certain that the conviction of the
alleged offender will not be wrongful.
Major deficiencies exist, however, with those statutes
requiring corroboration. For example, when the child is to be
excused from testifying, most hearsay statutes require a
showing of unavailability and corroborative evidence 1
corroboration was evinced in the notorious Jordan, Minnesota incident. Children were
removed from their homes as a result of the alleged existence of ritualistic sex parties with
adults. Following questions by the police, some of the children admitted that the charges
were true. Eventually charges against twenty-one of the accused adults were dropped. The
police later admitted to destroying videotapes on which the children denied the allegations
of molestation. Silas, 'Sex Ring' Fallou 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 17. The experience was
very traumatic for all the families involved. Some children were placed in foster homes until
the charges were dropped. Id at 18.
61. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (West 1988) provides:
(a) This section applies to criminal actions for the following:
(1) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3).
(2) Battery upon a child (IC 35-42-2-1(2)(b)).
(3) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).
(4) Confinement (IC 35-42-3-3).
(5) Rape (IC 35-42-4-1).
(6) Criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2).
(b) A statement or videotape that:
(1) Is made by a child who was under ten (10)
years of age at the time of the statement or
videotape;
(2) Concerns an act that is a material element of
an offense listed in subsection (a) that was allegedly
committed against the child; and
(3) Is not otherwise admissible in evidence under
statute or court rule; is admissible in evidence in
a criminal action for an offense listed in subsection
(a) if the requirements of subsection (c) are met..
(c) A statement or videotape described in subsection (b) is admissible
in evidence in a criminal action listed in subsection (a) if, after notice
to the defendant of a hearing and of his right to be present:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing:
(A) Conducted outside the presence of a jury; and
(B) Attended by the child; that the time, content,
and circumstances of the statement or videotape
provide sufficient indications of reliability; and
(2) The child:
(A) Testifies at the trial; or
(B) Is found by the court to be unavailable as a
witness because:
(i) A psychiatrist has certified that the child's
1990] NOTE
supporting the out-of-court statements. Not one statute,
however, even attempts to set guidelines for determining what
constitutes sufficient corroborative evidence.' Moreover, states
have formulated different requirements of what constitutes
sufficient corroboration, evincing no clear and -precise
standard.
For example, in Indiana after four cases of child sexual
abuse appeared before the Indiana Court of Appeals for the
participation in the trial would be a traumatic
experience for the child;
(ii) A physician has certified that the child cannot
participate in the trial for medical reasons; or
(iii)The court has determined that the child is
incapable of understanding the nature and obligation
of an oath.
(d) If a child is unavailable to testify at the trial for
a reason listed in subsection (c)(2)(B), a statement
or videotape may be admitted in evidence under this
section only if there is corroborative evidence of the
act that was allegedly committed against the child.
(e) A statement or videotape may not be admitted
in evidence under this section unless the prosecuting
attorney informs the defendant and the defendant's
attorney of:
(1) His intention to introduce the statement or
videotape in evidence; and
(2) The content of the statement or videotape;
within a time that will give the defendant a fair
opportunity to prepare a response to the statement
or videotape before the trial.
Id (citations omitted). The Indiana statute was created to allow "[a] very young child's
testimony . . . submitted at trial without subjecting the child to a further harmful ordeal."
Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. App. 1986). This statutory section does not
impinge upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation or his rights under
Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 72 (Ind. 1987). See
also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69030-7.69A (Supp. 1989). Utah is the only state that does
not require a showing of unavailability. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1988). But see
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which set forth requirements for hearsay statements to
meet the confrontation clause requirements if the declarant does not testify: (1) declarant
must be shown to be unavailable and (2) hearsay must bear the indicia of reliability. Id at
66. Under the Roberts standard, indicia of reliability can be shown with evidence that
possesses is a "particularized guarantee of trustworthiness" or a hearsay exception. Id The
Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 806, 811-13 (1984-85) [hereinafter Legislative Innovations].
62. It is suggested that the express lack of statutory standards governing sufficiency of
corroborative evidence confers a troublesome, broad discretionary power on the judge to
decide whether the corroboration constituted trustworthiness. Legislative Innovations, supra
note 61, at 819.
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First and Second Districts and the Supreme Court in one year,
no definite guidelines or standards concerning the boundaries
of corroboration 3 could be determined. In Hopper v. State,"
two eye witnesses testified to seeing the two-and-one-half year-
old victim laying partially clothed with her legs spread apart
next to the defendant, whose pants were unzippered. 5
Reddening around the child's vagina was found during a
medical examination.' Although the victim was found to be
incompetent, '7 her out-of-court statement made in response to
a general question by her mother,' only a few minutes after
the event occurred, was held to constitute an "excited
utterance"'  and was admissible. This, along with the two
witness' testimonies that were deemed to be corroborative
evidence of the act, was sufficient evidence to allow the jury
to convict the defendant.
In Altmeyer v. State,7 however, the court interpreted
Indiana's hearsay statute' slightly differently. There, based
upon a psychiatrist's testimony that court participation by the
victim would be a "severe traumatic experience,"'  the child
was found to be unavailable as a witness.74 On appeal, it was
decided that the child's videotaped statement would not be
admissible until the judge specifically entered "findings of fact
63. 20 Juv. & FAm. L. DIG., Nov. 1988, at 400. See State v. Petry, 524 N.E.2d 1293,
1298 (Ind. App. 1988).
64. 489 N.E.2d 1209 (Ind. App. 1986), cert denie4 479 U.S. 992 (1986).
65. Id at 1211. 20 Juv. & FAm. L. DIG., Nov. 1988, at 400.
66. Hopper, 489 N.E.2d at 1211.
67. Id. at 1212-13. The victim could not understand "the nature and obligation of an
oath." Id at 1212.
68. Id Entering the house moments after the act occurred, the mother took the child
into the bathroom and asked her what Hopper did to her. The child responded "mommy,
he touched my 'pee-pee' and my butt with his 'peter."' Id at 1211.
69. Excited utterances are exceptions to the traditional hearsay rule. See infra note 249
and accompanying text.
70. Hopper, 489 N.E.2d at 1209.
71. Altmeyer v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind. App. 1986).
72. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.




and conclusions of law concerning the reliability of the
videotaped statement."'  In the court's view, this would insure
the trustworthiness of the child's testimony.'
One month later, while affirming the earlier decision
that only the act needs to be corroborated and not the
assailant's identity, medical testimony of repeated acts of
vaginal penetration was deemed sufficient corroboration.' It
was further explained that due to a lack of physical
corroboration in such cases, medical testimony may suffice.'
In Miller v. State,' a five year-old girl had been
subjected to four years of sexual molestation by her
grandparents and father.' A psychiatrist who examined the
girl testified at trial that a courtroom appearance would be
too traumatic for her. The child was found to be unavailable
as a witness." In this instance, the corroborative evidence
consisted of prior statements and history elicited directly from
the child which related acts of molestation committed upon
other female family members." This, in conjunction with
medical testimony establishing that the child had experienced
vaginal and anal penetration," constituted sufficient
corroboration. Because the child was found to be unavailable
to testify at trial, the young girl's pre-trial videotaped
statement was found to be reliable and was admitted into
evidence.' The conviction was reversed on appeal, however,
75. Id
76. Id
77. Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd., 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind.
1987).
78. Miller, 498 N.E.2d at 1014.
79. Id at 1008.
80. Id at 1010-12, 1014.
81. Id at 1012.
82. Id
83. The young girl was described as being physically similar to a sexually active woman.
Id at 1013.
84. These findings were in accordance with the Indiana statute which allows a child,
under ten years of age at the time of the videotape, to be found unavailable as a witness.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(b)(1) (West 1988). One factor that must support a child's
unavailability to testify is a psychiatrist's certification that such participation in the trial would
1990]
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because the defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine the victim at the hearing.' In Dayton v. State,'
bruises found on the victim after she was with the defendant
established a prima facie case of abuse although the issue of
corroboration was not directly addressed.' Two years later,
the Indiana court allowed a trial court, in its discretion, to find
that psychological evidence, standing alone, provided the basis
for admission of a child's out-of-court statement?88
In many respects the 1984 Indiana statute mirrors
Washington's hearsay statute." However, Washington's
corroboration requirement for children who have been excused
from testifying has received greater attention." In Washington,
the most complete examination of the sufficiency of
corroborative evidence occurred in State v. Hunt. 9" There,
expert psychological testimony, along with evidence of the
child's behavior at the day facility, adequately fulfilled the
be a traumatic experience for the child. Id § (c)2(B)(1). However, such videotape is only
admissible if other corroborative evidence of the act exists. Id at § (d).
85. This may have been judicial error because the judge refused to allow the attorneys
to question the child or submit questions for the court to ask. Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d
64, 73 (Ind. 1987). Rather, the court found that even though the judge had the right to
question the child, not allowing any questions by counsel (under any method) was too broad
and was interpreted as a general bar on questioning. Id
86. 501 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
87. Id at 484 n.3. See 20 Juv. & FAM. L. Dio., Nov. 1988, at 399.
88. State v. Petty, 524 N.E.2d 1293, 1300 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). The court noted that
the trial court may find that psychological evidence in and of itself may still be inadequate
to provide sufficient corroboration. Id at 1300. In Petry, the psychiatrist's testimony that
common symptoms exist among sexually abused children was held to be insufficient in meeting
the corroboration requirement. Id
89. 20 Juv. & FAM. L DIG., Nov. 1988, at 400.
90. Pety, 524 N.E.2d at 1298.
91. 48 Wash. App. 840, 741 P.2d 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). The defendant was
charged with committing indecent liberties with his two and one half year-old daughter. Day
care employees described the child's unusual behavior, she would lie down "[w]ith two
blankets under her crotch and thighs so her bottom was elevated six to twelve inches off the
mat ... and would take her blankets and tuck them between her legs and would rock herself
to sleep on them." Id at 841, 741 P.2d at 567. Furthermore, the child was found by a day
care employee with her "[Qace down in prone position with her panties down and a little boy
was rubbing her fanny." Id The child also described conduct between her father and herself
using anatomically correct dolls. A psychologist testified that such explicit sexual behavior was
usually "learned activity," but not always indicative of sexual abuse. Id. at 842, 741 P.2d at
568.
1990] NOTE 233
corroboration requirement.' The court noted that because a
statutory definition of corroborative evidence did not exist, the
ordinary definition would be employed." Additionally, both
direct and indirect evidence ' could be used to establish
independent corroborative evidence," because only a prima
facie case need be put forth that a crime has been
committed.' Nevertheless, Hunt never officially determined
whether behavioral evidence in and of itself would be
sufficient. Therefore, the issue of expert testimony was still
not resolved.
The Hunt analysis of required corroboration of a child's
testimony was further extended in State v. Jones' to include
92. Id. at 868-49, 741 P.2d at 571. Corroborative evidence of the act was also defined
as "[e]vidence of sufficient circumstances which would support a logical and reasonable
inference that the act of abuse described in the hearsay statement occurred." Id. at 849,
741 P.2d at 571-72. In this instance, corroboration of the act consisted of the victim's sexual
contact with the little boy at the day care center. Id. at 842, 741 P.2d at 568.
93. Mary Kay Barbieri, Chief of the Criminal Division, gave the following example of
indirect corroborative evidence during a joint State Senate Judiciary Committee and State
House Ethics Hearing: "[i]t might be that the [child abuse victim], who had no way of getting
money, said 'he gave me a dollar if I'd perform a sex act,' and indeed this four year-old shows
up with a dollar." Id. at 848, 741 P.2d at 571 n.8 (citing 47 Leg., 1982 Sess. (January 28,
1982 at 10)). See also State v. Doe, 105 Wash. 2d 889, 719 P.2d 554 (1986).
94. Due to the lack of physical evidence in a majority of child sexual abuse cases,
indirect evidence in the form of expert testimony must also be considered. Hunt, 48 Wash.
App. at 848, 741 P.2d at 571 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
95. Independent evidence must not be of the same character to support a conviction
or send the case to the jury. Id. at 849, 741 P.2d at 571.
96. Id at 849, 741 P.2d at 571. See also State v. Jones, 50 Wash. App. 709, 750 P.2d
281 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988), where indirect corroborative evidence of defendant's indecent
liberties with his four year-old daughter consisted of nightmares and behavioral changes.
Id at 710-11, 750 P.2d at 282. Cf. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
Defendant's conviction for sexually abusing two boys was overturned due to the failure to
estal5lish the children's unavailability to testify and the lack of circumstantial guaranties made
concerning the children's incompetency to testify. Id at 178, 691 P.2d at 203. Because the
boys were not available to testify and their out-of-court statements did not meet the indicia
of reliability, the statements were not admissible. However, it should be noted that forcing
children to testify in court, which allows for cross-examination, never insures the full reliability
of their statements. Finding a child to be incompetent to testify does not mean that the
child's statements are unreliable. Hence, Ryan rests on faulty ground.
97. 50 Wash. App. 709, 750 P.2d 281 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). Unlike Hunt, no expert
testimony was presented in Jones. Rather, the corroborative evidence consisted of the
testimony of three other witnesses whom the defendant had solicited or engaged in similar
activity along with offered testimony about the four year-old's nightmares and behavioral
changes. Id. at 710-11, 750 P.2d at 282.
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behavioral changes and nightmares experienced by the child."
Thus, any relevant evidence supporting a reasonable inference
that the act occurred could be corroborative evidence under
the Washington hearsay statute.9
Of all the states with child sexual abuse hearsay
statutes, Kansas"® is one of the only states in which
corroboration of the act is not required even though the child
is available to testify. As long as the child's hearsay
statements are reliable, they are admitted into evidence."t '
Similarly, corroboration is not required for sexual
assault cases in Montana."~ In State v. A.D.M., t°3  the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. (dd) Actions involving children. In a criminal
proceeding or a proceeding pursuant to the Kansas
juvenile offender's code or in a proceeding to
determine if a child is a child in need of care under
the Kansas Code for care of children, a statement
made by a child, to prove the crime or that a child
is a juvenile offender of a child in need of care, if;
(1) The child is alleged to be a victim of the crime
or offense of a child in need of care, and
(2) The trial judge finds, after a hearing on the
matter, that the child is disqualified or unavailable
as a witness, the statement is apparently reliable and
the child was not induced to make the statement
falsely by use of threats or promises. If a statement
is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to
a jury, the trial judge shall instruct the jury that it
is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to
be given the statement and that, in making the
determination, it shall consider the age and maturity
of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made,
any possible threats or promises that might have
been made to the child to obtain the statement and
any other relevant factor.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1987). Cf. State v. Matlock, 233 Kan. 1, 660 P.2d 945
(1983).
101. Note that this statutory scheme poses problems. If a child witness similarly situated
to the child victim was present during the incident, the non-victim's testimony would not be
admitted. McNeil, The Admissibility of Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Pcrspective,
23 WASHBuRN LJ. 265, 278 (1984) [hereinafter McNeil].
102. State v. Metcalf, 153 Mont. 369, 378, 457 P.2d 453, 458 (Mont. 1969); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-301 (1987).
103. 216 Mont. 419, 701 P.2d 999 (1985).
NOTE
defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault of his five
year-old daughter." A videotaped statement was obtained
from the victim while she was in a foster home."° The court
concluded that corroboration of the victim's statement was
unnecessary because her testimony was consistent with her
prior statements. Moreover, the examining psychologist also
testified that the child's description of the activity was unusual
for a five year-old and was not likely to have resulted from
viewing pornography."
In circumstances similar to Jones, most defendants will
attempt to argue that the child's testimony must be
corroborated because a lengthy amount of time has passed
between the offense and any interviews, counseling, or
testimony. In most child sexual abuse cases, no witnesses are
present and the abuse has continued over a long period of
time. °7 Research has generally shown that young children are
incapable of fabricating detailed stories of sexual abuse.'"
New York has also made inroads in the area of
corroboration. In 1985 the legislature discontinued the
application of the corroboration requirement for sex offenses
under the Penal Law to civil proceedings under Article 10.'"
104. Id. at 419, 701 P.2d at 999.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 420, 701 P.2d at 1000. In very unusual detail for a five year-old, the victim
explained how her father forced her "to play with his 'winker dinker" and her performance
of oral sex with descriptions of the color, taste, and smell of semen. During the interview,
the child also related, with anatomically correct dolls, how her father "put his penis inside
her ... to demonstrate how her father had 'humped her.'" Id. at 420, 701 P.2d at 999.
107. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 321.
108. McGrath, supra note 44, at 240 (citing Lloyd, The Corroboration of Seual
Victimization of Children, in SExuAL ABUSE AND THE LAw 103, 105 (4th ed. 1983)).
109. N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 1046 (a)(vi) (McKinney 1985) provides:
(a) In any hearing under this article
(vi) previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of
abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence, but if uncorroborated,
such statements shall not be sufficient to make a fact-finding of abuse or
neglect. Any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the
previous statements, including, but not limited to the types of evidence
defined in this subdivision shall be sufficient corroboration. The
testimony of the child shall not be necessary to make a fact-finding of
1990]
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This relaxation is illustrative of the legislature's
acknowledgment that children's statements are inherently
trustworthy.' ° The broad, flexible rule now allows a child's
out-of-court statements to be corroborated by any other
evidence which tends to support its reliability."' This tips the
scale too far in the opposite direction, however, by vesting too
much discretion with a judge in determining whether a
statement has been reliably corroborated. Specific statutory
guidelines should be established to curtail the judges' open-
ended discretionary power.
To safeguard the defendant's right to confront the
declarant"' in termination proceedings, corroboration of a
child's out-of-court statements is needed. Uniform
corroboration standards should be maintained for all
jurisdictions, as opposed to a case by case determination of
what may, in that instance, constitute sufficient corroboration.
In some states only the act needs to be corroborated while
others also require corroboration of the identity of the
assailant. In addition, psychological testimony may be deemed
abuse or neglect.
Id. Because abuse proceedings are civil in nature, criminal rules of evidence do not apply.
The Family Court Act § 1046 (a)(vi) was amended in 1985 to make clear that the old
provisions of the penal law requiring specific forms of corroboration were not applicable in
civil proceedings. These requirements included establishing proof of occurrence and the
offender's identity when the victim was unable to consent due to his/her age. Thus, the
amended section now allows for corroboration by any other evidence of the child's
statements. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 1046 (a)(i)-(a)(v), (a)(vii) (McKinney 1983). Matter of
Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 118, 518 N.E.2d 914, 917, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21-22 (1987). See
People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 339 N.E.2d 139, 376 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1957); N.Y.LJ., Sept.
15, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
110. Matter of Nicole V., 123 A.D.2d 97, 510 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1987), aff'd., 71
N.Y.2d 112, 518 N.E.2d 914, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1987) (comments on the application of N.Y.
FA.m. Cr. Acr § 1046 (a)(vi)). See also Gallet, supra note 2, at 478.
111. Matter of Kimberly K., 123 A.D.2d 865, 507 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1986) (medical
evidence was sufficient corroboration of a child's out-of-court statements); Matter of Tina
H., 123 A.D.2d 864, 507 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2d Dep't 1986) (child's unsworn testimony was
sufficient corroboration of out-of-court statements concerning a description and demonstration
of sexual abuse); Matter of Cindy JJ., 105 A.D.2d 189, 484 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1984)
(two other daughters who had been sexually abused by the father supported the finding that
the youngest daughter was abused); Matter of Tara H., 129 Misc.2d 508, 494 N.Y.S.2d 953
(Fam. Ct. 1986) (proof that five year-old contracted gonorrhea was sufficient corroboration).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides "[lin all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
sufficient in some cases but not in others.
Although the relaxation of corroboration requirements
is aiding prosecutors in obtaining convictions of sex offenders,
it' also presents many new problems. Statutory schemes which
do not allow the non-victim child to corroborate the child
victim's hearsay statements may lead to a deficiency of
evidence, resulting in an acquittal. "3 Conversely, states with
excessively flexible standards permit too much judicial
discretion in deciding whether the evidence is reliable
hearsay. 4 Statutory reforms which will allow for uniform
corroboration standards with sufficiently narrow reliability
guidelines to circumscribe judicial discretion are needed.
B. The Hearsay Rule and Exception
1. Background Law
Many problems exist with the hearsay rule and its
exceptions in the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases. The
increase in the number of convictions may be attributed in
part to the development of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is "[a] statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.""' A
statement is "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.""6
Historically, hearsay statements were not admitted as
evidence because "the statement may not have been made
under oath; the declarant may not have been subjected to
113. See supra note 102.
114. Id.
115. FED. R. EvID. 801(c); accord MCCORMICK, supra note 37, § 246.
116. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). The effect of this definition was to exclude from the hearsay
rule evidence of conduct, whether verbal or nonverbal, that was not intended to be an
assertion. Verbal assertions readily fall into the category of a statement. Id. (advisory
Committee Notes and Legislature History). See also Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 214-17 (1948).
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cross-examination when he made the statement; and the jury
cannot observe the declarant's demeanor at the time he made
the statement.""'  Hearsay statements were also excluded
because of the opponent's lack of an opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant to test the strength and sincerity of the
statement."18  Although a statement may appear to be true,
cross-examination eliminates the dangers of allowing it as
evidence without further scrutiny.
Despite the traditional, overwhelming support for cross-
examination, the basic rule against hearsay is riddled with
exceptions which have developed over three centuries."9
Perhaps the most pervasive exception is the twenty-fourth:
A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will be best
served by the admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
117. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970). See also Morgan & McGuire,
Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1937) (historical
approach to the development of the hearsay rule and exceptions).
118. See lmwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239, 243 (1978).
119. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980); FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. The twenty four
exceptions to the hearsay rule may be invoked even though the declarant is available as a
witness. Included within the exceptions are: recorded recollections, vital statistics, excited
utterances, reputation as to character, family records, and statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. FED. R. EvID. 803.
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hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant."2
Each state's modifications of the hearsay rules'
inevitably raise questions regarding the exceptions and the
defendant's right to confrontation.'" Under the United States
Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides "[t]he accused
shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."'" The original vice that led to the confrontation
claim was "the practice of trying defendants on 'evidence'
which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions
secured by the examining magistrates, thus denying the
defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-
to-face encounter in front of the trier of fact."'24  A literal
reading of this clause would exclude all of a declarant's
statements not made during a trial"s and would clearly be
untenable as almost every hearsay exception would be
forbidden. Hence, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that certain competing interests, if closely
examined, may bring about a relaxation of the right of
confrontation at trial.'6
120. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
121. See infra Appendix.
122. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment was made applicable to the states
in 1965 via the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965); see
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
124. Green, 399 U.S. at 156. Because the confrontation clause only applies to criminal
prosecutions, with most litigation involving child sexual abuse being brought in juvenile and
divorse court, this concept may have to be rethought to be applied in noncriminal contexts.
Levy, Preface to Special Issue on Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAMILY L.Q., Fall 1989.
125. See Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (the admission of dying declarations
would be contrary to the letter of the provision).
126. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). However, recently the United States
Supreme Court upheld a defendant's right to confrontation in a child abuse case. In Coy v.
Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988), the court denied the use of a screen which would have allowed
1990]
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In restricting the range of admissible hearsay, the
confrontation clause has two functions.' First, a rule of
necessity is established." In such a case, the prosecution must
show the unavailability of the declarant whose statements the
prosecution wishes to use against the defendant."z Second,
once the witness has been shown to be unavailable, the
prosecution must show the trustworthiness of the statement."
The concept of 'trustworthiness' revolves around the well-
phrased term 'indicia of reliability,'" which concludes that
"certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations
that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports
with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.'M
t32
The admission of hearsay statements when the declarant
is available to testify poses no significant problem and the out-
of-court statements regain virtually all of the lost protection as
a result of the fact that the declarant may be cross-
examined.'33 Normally, when the declarant is not present to
be a witness at trial, it must be shown that the declarant is
unavailable." The declarant's statement must bear the
indicia of reliability, which can be established when the
statement falls under one of the firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions. Absent a showing of particularized guarantees
the child victim to testify without the visual contact with the defendant. Id.
127. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
128. Id. See also Note, Minnesota's Hearsay Exception For Child Victims of Sexual Abuse,
11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 799, 806 (1985) [hereinafter Minnesota]. The two considerations
which underlie the hearsay rule are a circumstantial probability of the statement's
trustworthiness and a demonstrated necessity for admission into evidence. Id. at 805. The
mere necessity, without some indicia of trustworthiness, will not suffice. Id. at 806.
129. Id. But see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (prosecution was not required to
produce the witness because utility of confrontation was remote); Cf. Read, The New
Confrontation - Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REX. 1, 43 (1972).
130. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). See also Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
133. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).




of trustworthiness, however, the evidence must be excluded."
2. Use of Hearsay in Sexual Child Abuse Cases
In United States v. Iron Shell,"3 7 the court held that two
hearsay statements admitted into evidence did not violate the
defendant's right to confrontation." The defendant was
charged with assault with the intent to commit rape. A
medical examiner and a police officer examined and
questioned the nine year-old victim.'" Their statements during
the trial relating the story the victim told them about the
physical abuse did not violate the hearsay rule and were
admitted into evidence.' Specifically, the doctor's testimony
was admitted under the hearsay exception which allows
"[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pains, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."'' Also, the
victim's motive in making the statements'42 to the doctor fell
within the patient-doctor relationship.'43 Thus, the victim's
motive was held to satisfy the 'guarantees of trustworthiness."'
In deciding whether the child's statements to the officer were
within the hearsay exceptions, the court considered Federal
136. Id.
137. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
138. Id at 87.
139. Id at 81.
140. Id. at 82-87.
141. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
142. The usual question when applying FED. R. EVID. 803(4) is whether the victim's
statements made to the doctor are pertinent to the treatment. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83.
If they are, it is presumed that the victim was motivated to tell the truth. Id. at 83-84. In
this case, during the examination the girl told the doctor that she was forced into bushes, her
pants and panties were pulled off, and the defendant tried to put something in her vagina
which made it hurt. Id. at 82.
143. Id. at 84.
144. Id.
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Rules of Evidence § 803(2)." In support of its reasoning that
the officer's testimony was admissible, the court highlighted
that only an hour had elapsed between the event and the
victim's statements'4 and that her "short bursts about the
incident"'47 qualified as "excitement" for the excited utterance
exception.
This case was unusual because the child, as a witness
at trial,' 4 was subjected to cross-examination, and her
demeanor and veracity could therefore be determined. 49 Even
if the child-witness testifies at trial, however, a confrontation
claim may not be precluded if the declarant is too young to
be thoroughly cross-examined.' 0 In Iron Shell, during direct
examination, the child was unable to remember in full detail
the statements she had made to the doctor and the officer.
Moreover, while no details were given concerning the subject
matter of the cross-examination, the victim was not questioned
about the assault or her statements made to the officer and
the doctor.'' The court found it "[d]ifficult to conclude on this
record that a more thorough cross-examination would not have
provided the protections inherent in the confrontation
clause."'52 Indeed, even if the victim was unable to testify, the
statements made by the doctor and the officer were found to
145. "A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED. R. EviD. 803(2).
146. Although only an hour had passed since the act occurred, time lapse between the
actual act and the victim's out-of-court statement is not dispositive under Rule 803(2). Iron
Shell, 633 F.2d at 85. Further, other factors may be considered such as the declarant's age,
his/her physical and mental condition, the subject matter of the out-of-court statements, and
the characteristics of the event. Id. at 86. Most importantly, it must appear that the
declarant's statements were spontaneous. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979)).
151. See id at 87.
152. Id. See also Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions For A Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse,
18 J. MARSHALl. L. REV. 1 (1984-85) [hereinafter Skoler]. The Iron Shell decision also rested
on statements that fell within the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions of excited utterances and
statements made to a treating physician. Id at 24 n.122. Additionally, reliance was placed
on the then recent Roberts decision. Id. at 23.
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contain sufficient indicia of reliability to render their admission
harmless error.
1 53
Similarly, in United States v. Frazier,' the defendant
was convicted of assault with the intent to commit rape. Four
hearsay statements made within twenty-four hours to the
victim's sister, her mother, a naval security officer, and a
detective were admitted into evidence despite discrepancies
inherent in their factual content. 55  Nevertheless, the
defendant's confrontation claim was unfounded because, as in
Iron Shell,156 the victim testified at trial, repeated her story,
and was subjected to cross-examination. 57 In determining
admissibility under the hearsay exception 803(24), "' the court
found that the testimony contained the five required elements:
[T]he circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
. . . [the statements] were made to people to
whom [the child] would naturally have made the
statements and I've also considered her very
young age as a factor on credibility
Secondly, the statements are offered as evidence
of material facts . . . Third, [they are] more
probative on the point . . . than any other
evidence that the government can procure...
and (fourthly) . . . the interest of justice (is)
best served by the admission of the statements
into evidence and the purposes of the rules of
evidence are served. The last element . . . the
proponent must give the adverse party notice
153. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 86-87.
154. 678 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
155. Id. at 501-02. The variations ranged from the fourteen year-old's description of the
defendant's touching her genital area, to forcible rape by the defendant. Nevertheless, all of
the descriptions conveyed the allegation of sexual assault sustained by the child. Id.; accord
20 Juv. & FAM. L. DIG., Aug. 1988, at 313.
156. See supra notes 13-53 and accompanying text.
157. Frazier, 678 F. Supp. at 502.
158. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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sufficient to have an opportunity to meet the
statements . . .all of the four statements were
provided some time ago.
159
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Lloyd," the defendant's
confrontation claim was held to be without merit. The court
refused to allow defendant's counsel to review the records of
the victim's psychiatric treatment in which it was concluded
that the defendant's history of venereal disease was relevant
to the victim's vaginal discharge. 6' The court emphasized that
the ability to question witnesses does not include pretrial
disclosure of any and all information useful in contradicting
unfavorable testimony.62 In short, the confrontation clause
"[o]nly guarantees 'an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent the defense might wish.""'
Due to the unique nature of child sexual abuse, the
victim's hearsay statements are highly relevant to the
disposition of the case. t" As has been pointed out, such
statements may constitute the only proof of the crime, as the
existence physical evidence is very rare. Although there has
been a significant amount of controversy concerning the
reliability of the victim's out-of-court statements, 65 few have
questioned the reliability of the victim's in-court statements.
In such a high-pressure setting, where the child-victim is
subjected to the intensity of these types of proceedings,
159. Frazier, 678 F. Supp. at 502.
160. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 367 Pa. Super. 139, 532 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987),
appeal docketed, 542 A.2d 1367 (1988); accord 20 Juv. & FAM. L. DIG., April 1988, at 177.
161. Lloyd, 367 Pa. Super. 139, 145, 532 A.2d 828, 831 (1987).
162. Id. at 146, 532 A.2d at 831 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)).
163. See id. (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39).
164. See Yun, supra note 9, at 1749.
165. Id. at 1751. Some commentators believe that these statements are inherently
trustworthy because a young child is unlikely to persist in lying to adults about sexual abuse.
Also, their knowledge of sexual encounters is usually limited. Id Conversely, other




confronting her assailant, the trauma of being in a courtroom,
and the possibility of lengthy questioning and cross-
examination, it would appear that out-of-court statements,
usually given in a more relaxed atmosphere, would be more
trustworthy.'"
3. The Mother's and Expert Witnesses' Testimony
An overwhelming majority of the hearsay statements
asserted in child sexual abuse cases revolve around the
victim's out-of-court statements made to a mother or doctor.
An additional question which poses trouble in many cases is
whether an expert should be allowed to testify that a child's
behavior typifies the behavior associated with victims of sexual
abuse.67
State v. J.S." involved the admission of hearsay
statements made to the victim's mother which led to the
conviction of her father for aggravated sexual assault of their
eleven year-old daughter. On appeal, the father's conviction
was reversed. The child told her friend the day after the
alleged incident that her father had placed his hands on her
private areas.' The friend retold the story to her mother
who questioned the child and told the child's mother."
Twelve days later, the child answered her mother's questions
by saying that her father had come in and out of her room
during an overnight visit, "feeling her body [and] putting his
166. Id at 1752-53. One suggestion that has been made to mitigate any prejudice to the
defendant from the use of out-of-court statements as evidence is requiring the judge to
conduct an evidentiary ruling outside the jury's presence. Id. at 1753 n.71; FED. R. EViD.
104(c), 103(c). Some states have mirrored the federal rules by providing for similar
provisions. Yun, supra note 9, at 1753 n.71.
167. Note, The Unreliability of Erpen Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual
Abuse Victims, 74 GEo. LJ. 429, 431 (1985) [hereinafter Epen Testimonyj.
168. 222 NJ. Super. 247, 536 A.2d 769 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), cert denied, 111
NJ. 588, 546 A.2d 513 (1988).
169. Id. at 251, 536 A.2d at 771.
170. Id.
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fingers in her vagina.''. This testimony, received under New
Jersey's fresh complaint rule" was held not to be a
"complaint," and the conviction was reversed. Furthermore,
the court decided that the child did not volunteer the
information, but responded to a line of questioning by her
mother.'" In the court's view, the child's statements should
not have been extracted by 'interrogation,' but should have
been self-motivated as expression of grief or outrage on the
child's part.'74
171. Id.
172. The fresh complaint rule permits the state to show, in sexual abuse prosecutions,
that the victim complained of the act within a reasonable time to someone the victim would
turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice. Id. (citing State v. Tirone, 124 NJ. Super. 530,
308 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. 1973), rev'd, 64 NJ. 530, 314 A.2d 601 (1974)). Note that the
definition of what constitutes a reasonable time may vary from case to case and opens the
door for a vast amount of judicial discretion.
173. When the mother first questioned her daughter, she cried and did not want to talk.
The mother then asked her daughter about the event and the child just answered "yes" or
"no." State v. J.S., 222 NJ. Super. 247, 253, 536 A.2d 769, 772 (NJ. Super. 1988).
174. Id. at 253, 536 A.2d at 772. The court relied on Professor Wigmore's statement:
(1) Only the fact of the complaint, not the details. Tle purpose is to
negative the supposed inconsistency of silence by showing that there was
not silence. Thus, the gist of the evidential circumstances is merely non-
silence, i.e., the fact of a complaint, but the fact only. That she
complained of a rape, or an attempt at rape, is all that principle permits;
the further terms of her utterance (except so far as to identify the time
and place with that of the one charged) are not only immaterial for the
purpose, but practically turn the statement into a hearsay assertion, and
as such it is inadmissible (except on the third theory).
Id. at 254, 536 A.2d at 772-73 (citation omitted). In overruling State v. Ramos, 203 NJ.
Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985), which allowed the victim's
statement to corroborate her assertion of assault, the court offered principles to guide the
trial court in receiving statements under the fresh complaint rule.
First, details of the offense should be confined to those minimally
necessary to identify the subject matter of the victim's complaint. Second,
the court should specify for the jury in its instructions the particular
testimony to which the fresh complaint rule applies. Third, the jury
should be informed that the testimony was allowed only to show that
within a reasonable time the victim reported the criminal event to one
in whom she would naturally confide under the circumstances, not for the
truth of the victim's complaint. Fourth, the purpose of the rule should
be explained as one which enables the State to meet in advance the
internal contradiction which might appear from an apparent failure of the
victim to make such a complaint; the explanation should be given in
language which does not fail to inform the jurors that its use is confined
to neutralizing the inference that might otherwise be drawn that her
behavior was inconsistent with a claim of sexual abuse. Reference to the
NOTE
State v. J.S. is extremely troublesome because it evinces
the court's lack of knowledge concerning signs of sexual
abuse."' In many instances, children are so traumatized by
acts of sexual abuse that it is emotionally and psychologically
difficult to voluntarily explain what happened." If the court
was fully aware of and sensitive to the nature of child sexual
abuse, they may have understood that because the perpetrator
in this instance was the father, the child was probably more
reluctant to tell her mother. Moreover, even though outward
signs of abuse are not displayed by a child, she may be
emotionally scarred.'" For the court to claim that the child's
statements were not self-motivated demonstrates the court's
inability to appreciate the delicate nature of the abuse.
Thus, the court in J.S. overruled State v. Ramos"8 which
allowed statements made to the victim's mother as
corroborative of the victim's assertion. In Ramos, the child
victim's out-of-court statements were admitted into evidence
on three different theories. 9  One of them, the fresh
complaint rule, allowed the out-of-court statements to be
admitted "[n]ot for the purpose of proving the truth of the
assertion made, but to show that it was in fact made as
corroboration of the victim's assertion that she was assaulted -
- a way to bolster her testimony.""° This dispels any beliefs
that the acts did not transpire as it is deemed a natural
complaint as "supporting" or "bolstering" her credibility should not be
made.
IS., 222 N.J. Super. at 257, 536 A.2d at 774. Emphasis was further placed on the fact that
these statements will only serve "to rebut in advance the assumption that the victim failed to
report the fact that she had been defiled" and "not to rehabilitate the credibility of an
impeached victim or as proof of an excited utterance." Id.
175. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
177. Id.
178. 203 NJ. Super. 197, 496 A.2d 386 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
179. Id. at 202-05, 496 A.2d at 388-90. The out-of-court statements were admitted based
upon the common law concept of the fresh complaint rule, excited utterance, and spontaneous
declaration. Id.
180. Id. at 202-03, 496 A.2d at 338.
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reaction for the child victim to complain about the abuse.'81
This common law doctrine does not involve the use of the
hearsay statute or any of the hearsay statements."s  Thus,
admitting the child's statements to show consistency with the
acts allegedly committed and to provide additional support for
the child's testimony served the function of rendering the
child's statements admissible." Moreover, the fresh complaint
rule, which seems to serve no other purpose than to prove
that the victim did not remain silent about the act, does not
aid the victim in proving abuse.
The use of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases
is just beginning to take form.' While advocates for children
believe that expert testimony is necessary because of the
scarcity of legally acceptable proof in child sexual abuse cases,
defense attorneys believe juries can adequately comprehend
the manifestations of abuse without the aid of expert
testimony.181
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for a hearsay
exception for medical testimony, consisting of "[s]tatements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain,
or sensations, or the inception of general character of the
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."'" Narrowing the focus
of expert testimony, the true questions become: under what
circumstances should expert testimony be admissible into
181. Id. at 202, 496 A.2d at 388.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 202-03, 496 A.2d at 388. Because of this, the substance of the 'fresh
complaint' was "immaterial and inadmissible." Id at 203, 496 A.2d at 388.
184. See Expert Testimony, supra note 167, at 432. There are various types of expert
testimony, including the diagnosis of sexual abuse to prove that the abuse occurred, to vouch
that the complaintant is a credible witness, to enhance the child's credibility by explaining
unusual behavior, and to explain the overall capabilities of children as witnesses. Borgida,
Greshman, Swim, Bull & Gray, Expen Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: An Empirical
Investigation of Partisan Orientation, 23 FAMI.Y L.Q., Fall 1989, at 434.
185. Epen Testimony, supra note 167, at 431 nn.9-11.
186. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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evidence?, what types of testimony are permitted?, and are
any regulations or guidelines needed to provide a standard
basis to determine the credibility of the testimony? Each state
has answered these questions differently.
In State v. Danielski," the court refused to admit expert
testimony regarding typical symptoms of familial sexual abuse
into evidence."s  The child's step-father was charged with
seventeen counts of various sexual offenses for acts of
penetration and sexual conduct with his seventeen year-old
step-daughter1 which began when the child was nine. To
admit expert testimony under the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence it must be "[h]elpful to the jury and its probative
value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice."""9 ' The decision of whether the testimony
meets this standard is left to the trial court's discretion."g
Relying heavily on State v. Saldana,' the court held that a
187. State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
188. Id. at 398.
189. Id. at 396.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 396-97; accord, MINN. R. EVD. 702. "If scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Danieiski, 350 N.W.2d 396..97;
See also State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
192. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d at 397. Furthermore, "[a]s long as the trial court makes an
initial determination that the expert is sufficiently qualified to testify, we ordinarily do not
disturb its discretionary evaluation of the probative value of the'testimony versus the danger
of unfair prejudice." State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984).
193. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 227. Expert testimony regarding typical post-rape symptoms
and the behavior of rape victims, also known as the rape trauma syndrome, were inadmissible.
Id. at 227. It was feared that this type of evidence would result in undue prejudice in the
minds of the jurors. The only relevant question to have been decided was whether the crime
occurred, not what the typical manner in which the victim reacted was. Moreover, only the
elements of the crime had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 229-30. Although
the description of the syndrome was the substance of the expert testimony, it was not
regarded as 'reliable enough' to surpass the jurors' common sense:
Permitting ... an expert to suggest that because the complainant exhibits
some of the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the complainant was
therefore raped, unfairly prejudices the appellant by creating an aura of
special reliability and trustworthiness. Since jurors of ordinary abilities
are competent to consider the evidence and determine whether the
alleged crime occurred, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any
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licensed psychologist's expert testimony concerning the familial
sexual abuse syndrome and its relation to the victim's
behavioral signs of sexual abuse was inadmissible." 4  No
distinction was made between the rape trauma syndrome in
Saldana and the familial abuse syndrome in Danielski.
Moreover, the court applied the Saldana rule without
considering whether consent was an issue.'"
In distinguishing cases that admitted expert testimony
on the battered child syndrome, the court reasoned that the
battered child syndrome is "victim oriented" and explained that
the victim's injuries were not accidental." However, the same
can be said concerning the familial abuse syndrome. The
abuse is not accidental, in most cases no eye witnesses are
present, and the abuse occurs at the hands of a family
member. 97 While the court in Dandelski acknowledged these
facts,' it reasoned that the victim was seventeen years-old and
could testify on her own behalf. Therefore, no testimony
concerning typical sexual abuse symptoms needed to be put
forth because the jury could decide on its own whether she
was telling the truth.'" Allowing courts to venture out on the
slippery slope of age differentiation in these discretionary
matters will inevitably lead to bad decisions. Too much
discretion will be left in the hands of judges in determining
whether a child is old enough and has intelligence sufficient to
convey the information.' Maintaining this level of
probative value. To allow such testimony would inevitably lead to a
battle of experts that would invade the jury's province of fact-finding and
add confusion rather than clarity.
Id. at 230.
194. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d at 396, 398.
195. Id. at 397.
196. id.
197. See generally COHEN, supra note 5.
198. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d at 397-98.
199. Id. at 398.
200. The court stated:
Under Saldana such expert testimony is inadmissible for this purpose
when the victim here is a 17 year-old of at least average intelligence. No
reason exists for reaching a different result simply because the alleged
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differentiation is illustrative of the prevalent indifference
toward understanding the true nature of child sexual abuse
and the various effects it has on the victim.
Six months after the Danielski decision, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that expert testimony concerning typical
characteristics and traits of sexually abused children was
admissible."' In 1984, James Alan Myers was convicted of
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree for the sexual
abuse of the daughter of the woman with whom he lived.'
The abuse began when the victim was six years-old and
continued for approximately one year.' A psychologist
testified as to characteristics observed in children who had
been sexually abused.' The court did not question the
doctor's competency as she had significant practical experience
and her educational qualifications were more than adequate.'
abuser was a step-father and the charge is familial sexual abuse rather
than when the abuser is unrelated and the charge is criminal sexual
conduct.
Id.
201. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
202. Id. at 606. Due to the tender age of the victim (6 years old) she was not able to
differentiate between sexual penetration and contact. Id. at 607. However, she could testify
that the defendant touched her chest and her legs. Id.
203. Id. at 606.
204. Describing what the psychologist referred to as incest, "sexual abuse by any person
occupying a caring-parental role with respect to the child victim, whether or not there is any
legal or blood relationship between them." Id. at 608 n.2. Characteristics include:
Fear - the child is afraid to tell of the abuse because she will be blamed
or punished, she fears the possible breakup of the family, she fears she
won't be believed; confusion, particularly in young children - the child
feels this is not right, but the adult perpetrator, a person in authority,
tells the child it is right; a poor relationship between the mother and
daughter - the child does not trust the mother, is afraid of what she will
do with the information, and does not look to her mother for support.
Id. at 608. The proper role for a psychiatrist "[i]s that of information processing, not
decision making. If the judge is to benefit from such expert testimony in making the ultimate
decision, the testimony must be delivered completely as well as neutrally - even if some of
it is ignored by the law." Hall, The Role of Psychologists as Eqwr in Cases Involving
Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAMILY L.Q., Fall 1989, at 454.
205. Meyer, 359 N.W.2d at 609; Cf. State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 608, 645 P.2d 1330,
1333-34 (1982). The following is the testimony of a qualified expert in pediatrics and child
psychiatry:
Q Based upon your experience, Dr. Mann, have you
had an opportunity to - in the past - to assess the
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Therefore, the court only had to resolve the question of
whether such testimony consisted of the proper subject matter
to be rendered admissible.' Acknowledging the nature of
child abuse and the possibility that lay jurors could be "placed
at a disadvantage," the court stated:
In the case of a sexually abused child consent is
irrelevant .and jurors are often faced with
determining the veracity of a young child who
tells of a course of conduct carried on over an
ill-defined time frame and who appears an
uncertain or ambivalent accuser and who may
even recant. Background data providing a
relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the
child's conduct and demeanor which the jury
could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her
credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of
sexual abuse of children, and particularly of
children as young as this complainant.'
While the topic of expert testimony in child sex abuse
cases has not been fully. developed, states are beginning to
acknowledge its value.' Nonetheless, uniform federal
procedures governing the admission of expert testimony should
credibility of reported rape cases by children
involving family members?
A Yes.
o Approximately how many times have you done this?
A I would say about 70 times, 70 cases.
o And, as a result of your interviews and examinations
of these witnesses, have you arrived at conclusions
with respect to the truthfulness of these reported
rape cases involving family members?
A Yes.
O Upon what do you base your conclusions as to the
credibility of such claims?
A There are several factors. One is the consistency of
the account of the alleged sexual abuse. There are
some common emotional reactions we frequently
find in victims, which consists of a fear of safety,
fear of future sexual abuse, feelings of depression or
anxiety, embarrassment to have the alleged
happenings known to peers or other people around
them, a negative view of sex, some doubts that one
parent might by strong enough to protect further
sexual abuse. It is also important to see whether the
mental status is basically normal. That means there
is no disturbing thinking. That memory functions
are intact, and that there is a good sense of right or
wrong or fairness and no excessive fantasizing.
0 Now, as a result of your experience and training in
NOTE
be established. This would provide a foundation for the
judges' decisions regarding the credibility of expert/medical
witnesses.
Conversely, if uniform procedures are not workable,
guidelines should be established which would remedy the
discrepancies created by the vast amount of discretion left to
judges. Moreover, prosecutors would have guidance in
determining, prior to trial, whether the testimony of their
expert would be more likely -to be- found credible or
incredible.
Even if uniform procedures or guidelines are not
established, medical testimony should be allowed during the
trial, unless the doctor is found to be incredible. This would
eliminate much of the discretion otherwise given to judges in
deciding whether the victim is of proper age to adequately and
intelligently inform the court of the crime committed.
4. Survey of Legislative Developments
An increasing number of states have enacted legislation
dealing with child victims of sexual abuse.' Washington and
Kansas were in the forefront of adopting relevant hearsay
exceptions.1° Although other states have developed hearsay
exceptions, statutory schemes differ. While some states only
require a finding of reliability, others require corroborative
evidence when the witness is unavailable."' For example,
Arizona, Minnesota, and South Dakota require that the out-
of-court statement(s) must bear sufficient indicia of
reliability. '12 Also, if the victim in unavailable as a witness,
corroborative proof must be offered into evidence. 3 The
209. Over 23 states have developed hearsay exceptions specifically addressing child sexual
abuse. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also Appendix.
210. Skoler, supra note 152, at 9. See also Yun, supra note 9, at 1746 (discussion of
Washington hearsay statute); McNeil, supra note 101 (discussion of Kansas hearsay statute).
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states vary as to the type of corroborative evidence that must
be offered. While Arizona requires corroboration of the out-
of-court statement, Minnesota and South Dakota require
corroboration of the act.21 4  Furthermore, while parts of the
statutes are very specific, other areas are phrased very
broadly.2"5 Most of the statutes only state that the out-of-court
statements must bear sufficient indicia of reliability, but very
few describe in detail what factors to consider in determining
reliability.2"6 Arkansas specifically lists thirteen detailed factors
to consider in determining the likelihood of trustworthiness in
out-of-court statements. 17
Including this list in the statute divests judges of their
open ended discretion and sets guidelines on which their
determinations are to be based. Judges should be required
to specifically state why certain statements do not have
sufficient indicia of reliability. For those states that do not
have a list in the statute similar to Arkansas', it would at least
provide a common law basis to which judges could refer.
Additionally, state statutes have applied different age
limitations concerning their application to children.218
Nevertheless, the statutes are similar to the extent that they
comply with the Ohio v. Roberts219 standard regarding the
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause in sexual abuse
cases.no Roberts stated that a defendant has the right to





218. Id. Application of the different states' hearsay statutes vary according to the
childrens' ages. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Minnesota, Nevada, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Washington have hearsay statutes that are applicable if the child is under ten years of age.
Id. The hearsay statutes of Missouri and Texas apply to children under twelve years of age,
Illinois and Rhode Island apply under 13, and Georgia's applies to children under 14 years
of age. Id. Note that Minnesota's also applies to those who are mentally impaired. Id.
219. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
220. Id. at 62-66.
221. Id at 63-64.
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testify and the prosecution intends to introduce the declarant's
statement(s) into evidence, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the declarant is unavailable.' To enable the
declarant's statements to be admissible as evidence, however,
these statements must also meet "adequate 'indicia of
reliability."'"m The court in Roberts defined reliabile statements
as including those statements which fall "within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception"'m or that show "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."'t
States without special hearsay exceptions are beginning
to see the need to adopt such legislative reforms in the area
of child sexual abuse. For example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has proposed amendments to the Evidence Act to allow
a child's out-of-court statements to be admitted under certain
circumstances.' The decision to propose the amendments
was made after State v. D.R. was decided. "7
In State v. D.R., a two and one-half year-old girl was
sexually assaulted by her grandfather.'m The appellate division
adopted a previously unstated exception to the hearsay rule
which allowed the court to admit the child's out-of-court
statements relating the details of the sexual contact made to
a non-treating psychologist.' The exception adopted by the
court would also authorize the admission of a child's out-of-
court statements made to a parent, physician, other
professional or confidant as long as sufficient indicia of
222. Id at 65.
223. Id. at 66.
224. id.
225. Id.
226. State v. D.R., 214 NJ. Super 278, 518 A.2d 1122 (1986), rev'd, 109 NJ. 348, 537
A.2d 667 (1988). See also 20 Juv. & FAM. L. DIG., Oct. 1988, at 365.
227. Id.
228. State v. D.R., 109 NJ. 348 (1988), 537 A.2d 667 (1986). The grandfalher made
a tape recorded confession in which he admitted that he inserted his penis into the child's
mouth, allowed her to touch and kiss his penis, and that he also had incidental contact with
her vagina. This confession was repudiated at trial. Id. at 353, 537 A.2d at 669.
229. State v. D.R., 214 NJ. Super. 29, 518 A.2d 1122 (NJ. Super. 1986).
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reliability could be shown."
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction holding that the statements were
inadmissible hearsay. Aside from the defendant's confession,
which was repudiated at the trial,232 the only evidence the
prosecution could put forth, because the child was found to
be an incompetent witness, were the child's statements to the
psychologist. 3  Without a hearsay exception, the evidence
could not be admitted and the prosecution failed to meet its
burden of proof. The court strongly believed that the
legislature and the Governor should implement the necessary
changes to the rules of evidence, not the judiciary.' The
court did, however, set forth proposed amendments to the
New Jersey Rules of Evidence for the hearsay exception
invoked by the appellate division.S In recognizing the need
for prompt attention to this matter, the court by-passed
submitting the proposed rules to the Judicial Conference.'
Rather, the amendments were transmitted directly to the
legislature and the Governor and would become effective
immediately upon their approval. 7  State v. D.R., then, is a
perfect example of a case in which the need for settled
hearsay exceptions on state levels was clear. That need
should not arise, however, when the issue is first presented in
court.
States which have already enacted legislative reforms to
hearsay statutes have recognized the need for innovation in
the area of child sexual abuse, but many of these reforms fail
231. Id.
232. Id at 353, 537 A.2d at 669.
233. Id. The victim was unable to differentiate between lying and telling the truth. On
some occasions she would respond to questions and on other occasions she would not. The
court found that it would not be appropriate to let her testify. State v. D.R., 214 N.J. Super.
278 (1986), 518 A.2d 1122 (1986), rev'd, 109 NJ. 348, 537 A.2d 667 (1988).
234. State v. D.R., 109 NJ. 348, 537 A.2d 667 (1988). See also 20 JUv. & FAM. L.
DIG., Oct. 1988, at 372.
235. D.R, 109 NJ. at 362, 537 A.2d at 681.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 362.
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to acknowledge that a child's statements are inherently
reliable.' In some instances, corroboration of the act is also
required under the hearsay exception and such evidence may
not be available. The prosecution's entire case almost always
revolves around the child's out-of-court statements made to
close friends, relatives, or physicians.' To demand a strict
test for the indicia of reliability of a child's out-of-court
statements is not tenable while finding the child's in-court
testimony to be inherently reliable. It is more likely that a
child would be under pressure to falsify or invent statements
while in court. The intimidation of the courtroom, unfamiliar
crowds of people, and having to confront the offender may
result in unclear or fragmented testimony, lapses of memory,
and possible recantation. A more straight forward voluntary
account of the incident would probably be elicited in a less
intimidating atmosphere as when the child is being examined
by a physician, telling the story to her mother or someone to
whom the child looks to for guidance.
Furthermore, while states require reliability for out-of-
court statements, most do not provide guidelines for
determining what constitutes sufficient reliability. ' Although
the hearsay exceptions are somewhat flexible, in certain areas
they are either too broad or too rigid. 41 More conclusive,
uniform and fully defined exceptions which will admit the
child's out-of-court statements on the assumption that they are
inherently reliable are urgently needed.
With the acknowledgment by society that child sexual
abuse is a national problem, more research has been
conducted by psychologists and other professionals and their
238. See Yun, supra note 9, at 1756.
239. See Bulkley, National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection,
Young Lawyers Division, American Bar Association, Recommendations for Improving Legal
Intervention in Intrafamily Child Abuse Cases 30 (1982).
240. But see Arkansas' hearsay statute which lists thirteen criteria to determine whether
the out-of-court statement possesses "a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness." See infra
Appendix.
241. See supra notes 138-248 and accompanying text.
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testimony is available to support the reliability of the child's
out-of-court statements. Moreover, young children are not
aware of adult sexuality and behavior which would enable
them to falsify or fantasize such accounts.' An exception
which takes all of these facts into account, however, would
have to meet the mandates of the confrontation clause.43
Finally, the children's ages in which the exceptions
would be applicable should also be reconsidered.' 4  For
example, while an eleven year-old may be extremely,
psychologically traumatized and found to be an incompetent
witness, she would not fit into the ten year-old age limit under
Washington's statutory hearsay exception.245 The correlation
between a child's reaching a certain age and the development
of his/her own ability to testify at trial cannot be arbitrarily
drawn. It is clear that each individual may mature differently.
This may directly relate to their individual personalities, life
experiences, or ethnic background. For state legislatures to
choose such arbitrary age limits in applying the statutory
hearsay exceptions, therefore, is truly unfounded. In the eyes
of the federal law, sexually abused children and children in
general are defined as those individuals under eighteen years
of age. 2' States should not be allowed to maintain their own
age limits. If the federal age definition of a child is not
adopted by all the states, however, the state legislatures should
be fully informed about all aspects of child sexual abuse
before such age differentiations are finalized.
C. Excited Utterances
There also exists a hearsay exception which enables
prosecutors to admit the child victim's out-of-court statements
242. See supra note 108.
243. See supra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
245. See infra Appendix.
246. See supra note 1.
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made to an adult,47 regardless of whether the child testifies at
trial. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an excited
utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition make while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition.'" The exception
to the heasay rule for excited utterances was developed from
the term res gestae which has generally been defined as
follows:
A statement is admissible as explanatory of an
event or occurrence provided the statement was
spontaneous and, when considering all the
circumstances under which it was made, sufficient
time had not elapsed to contrive or fabricate so
as to render the declaration in the nature of a
self-serving statement. 49
Two of the key criteria in determining whether a child's
statement is an excited utterance is the timeliness of the
statement and whether the child was under "stress or
excitement caused by the event or condition.""0  These criteria
were set up to avoid the problem of fabrication or reflection.
While each factor may be considered separately, they are
somewhat intertwined, as the timeliness in reporting the
incident may or may not support the amount of stress
portrayed."' For example,"2  assume father (F) sexually
assaulted his five year-old daughter (D). One month later the
mother questioned D about her unusual behavior. (D is very
247. Comment, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Erception
and the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1985).
248. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
249. Note, A Tender Years Doctrine for the Juvenile Courts: An Effective Way to .Protect
the Sexually Abused Child, 61 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 249, 253 (1984).
250. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). See also Legislative Responses, supra note 247, at 1030.
251. Mele, supra note 12, at 266. But sce Brown v. U.S., 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945)
(cited in Minnesota, supra note 128, at 809 n.55), where the three year-old victim calmly
reported the assault during a dinner time conversation.
252. Any facts used in the hypothetical are not intended to be related to any case.
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withdrawn and refuses to be left alone with F). In response
to the mother's general question "what is wrong?" D began
crying as she answered in a descriptive and excited manner
(using terminology consistent for a 5 year-old) and related the
details of the abuse.
There will most likely be an argument regarding the
admission of the child's statement. The prosecution would
probably try to argue that while no dispositive time limits have
been set to determine "timeliness of the statement,"2" the child
was still under extreme stress caused by the sexual assault. In
response, the defense would probably maintain that the report
one month after the event is too far removed and thus is
subject to fabrication or falsification.
As the hypothetical demonstrates, the answer to the
question of what constitutes an excited utterance is not readily
apparent. Depending on each states' laws, the results will
inevitably vary. 4
In State In Interest of CA.," a three year old sister and
her two year-old brother were sexually assaulted by their
cousin. The children reported the incident to their mother.' "
During the trial, the state attempted to admit all of the oral
out-of-court statements under the excited utterance exception
to the hearsay rule.2" The defense argued that because the
children were found incompetent to testify, the hearsay
statements were unreliable. 8  While the trial court only
admitted the childrens' statements which were made on the
253. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
254. Evidence, Sexual Abuse of Children: The Justification for a New Hearsay Exception,
5 Miss. L. REV. 177, 181 (1985). See also State v. Bauer, 704 P.2d 264 (Ariz. App. 1988)
(victim's excited utterance included the act of rubbing her vagina); Commonwealth v. Adams,
503 N.E.2d 1315 (Mass. App. 1987) (child's statement still res gestae even though the mother
told the police four months later).
255. 210 NJ. Super. 28, 492 A.2d 683 (NJ Super. App. Div. 1985). See also 17 Jiv. &
FAm. L. Dio., Dec. 1985, at 416.
256. State In Interest of 'C.A., 201 NJ. Super. 28, _, 492 A.2d 683, 685 (NJ. Super.
App. Div. 1985).




first day, 9 the court was reversed on appeal and none of the
statements were admitted into evidence.' In justifying the
reversal, the court declared:
A court may make allowances for a child's youth
and naivete in extending the time during which
the nervous excitement continues to enhance the
reliability of the statement. A child's youth and
naivete, however, are not substitutes for the
stress of a nervous excitement, which is the basis
for the hearsay exception. If the children here
were not speaking under that stress, their
statements are "far more of the character of
testimony at trial than ... of the character of an
excited utterance."26t
Despite the fact that the excited utterance exception
to allows a child's spontaneous declarations to be admissible
and that some states have relaxed the requirements,
prosecutors are still experiencing difficulties in admitting such
out-of-court statements into evidence. Because no time limits
have been mandated under the exception, judges have been
vested with an inordinate amount of discretion in determining
whether the statement was rendered in a timely manner.
Further, this exception does not cover those situations where
a child may report the sexual abuse in a quiet and calm
demeanor. Just as it is true that individuals deal with
situations in a variety of ways, not all children will react with
outward displays of stress or trauma. The inward scars that
such a heinous crime leaves within the victims will not always
manifest themselves in a visible, out-pouring of emotion.
259. The trial court judge determined that these statements were given in a close
proximity to the time of the event. Id. Thus, there was no opportunity for the children to
fabricate their stories. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at _, 492 A.2d at 686 (citations omitted).
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Without indications of stress or excitement resulting from the
act, it seems less likely that the oral out-of-court statements
will fall within the excited utterance hearsay exception. The
excited utterance doctrine should be extended to allow for
specific application to child sexual abuse cases.
IV. TERMATION OF A FATHERs
PARENTAL R HIS
In some instances, legislative reforms in the area of
hearsay 2 have led courts to terminate the father's right to
custody and/or visitation after he has been convicted for sexual
abuse.' In most instances, however, fathers who are found
guilty of sexual abuse retain their visitation rights. Thus, not
only is the child victim exposed to the trauma of the initial
proceeding to determine whether sexual abuse actually
occurred, a dispositional hearing must also be held to
determine whether the father's parental rights should be
terminated.' This second stage rarely occurs at the lower or
family court level. Often it is held before a supreme or
district court and the justices/judges tend to be less familiar
with family law matters.' Additionally, the child victim is
often required to testify (if available) at both hearings.
Recently, the United State Supreme Court established
a minimum evidentiary standard (clear and convincing
evidence) for terminating parental rights.2" Due to the
262. See supra note 210-46 and accompanying text.
263. In re Interest of A.C.B., 743 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (father's right to
natural child terminated); State in Interest of J.D., 494 So. 2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986) (father's
rights terminated as to two adoptive daughters and natural son); U.S. v. Azure, 845 F.2d
1503 (8th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Tanya P., 120
Cal. App. 3d 66, 174 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); In Interest of E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d
531 (Iowa 1987); People v. Groff, 71 N.Y.2d 101, 578 N.E.2d 908, 524 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1987);
Matter of Ryan D., 125 A.D.2d 160, 512 N.Y.S.2d 601 (4th Dep't 1987).
264. See 23 JuDGEs J. 1 (1984).
265. id.
266. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (prior to completely severing the parents'
rights in their child, due process requires the allegations to be proven by clear and convincing
evidence).
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severity of a complete termination of rights, including the right
to visit, communicate, or regain custody of the child, 7 the
Supreme Court found that the standard of fair preponderance
of the evidence did not provide adequate safeguards for
protecting parents' due process rights.' Applying the factors
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,' the fair preponderance
standard was deemed inconsistent with due process because
"[i]n parental rights termination proceedings, the private
interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using
a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing
governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively
slight.""27  It seems apparent, however, that this higher
standard does not take the child victim and the possible future
physical and the psychological consequences that could result
if the father's rights are not terminated into consideration.
Additionally, no consideration has been given to the fact that
the prosecution, who was able to prove sexual abuse at the
initial hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, will almost
invariably find it extremely difficult to meet the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard at the termination
proceeding.27' It is difficult to understand why the prosecution
has the burden of meeting such a high standard of proof when
the defense, the father who is often the perpetrator of this
outrageous crime, shares none of the none of the burden.
Many cases of child sexual abuse continue to flood the
courts, resulting in an increase in the number of parental
267. Id. at 749.
268. Id. at 753. The court found that a more critical need for procedural protections
exists in those persons facing the dissolution of their parental rights rather than in ongoing
state intervention into family affairs, such as a finding of abuse. Id. See also Note, Santosky
v. Kramer: Clear and Convincing Evidence in Actions to Terminate Parental Rights, 36 U.
MIAit L. REv. 369 (1982).
269. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
270. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758. See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (three factors set forth
to balance in regard to termination proceedings).
271. It is argued that these offenders (note that they have already been found guilty of
sexual abuse) have a due process right to a higher evidentiary standard because it is now a
constitutional issue, not strictly a family law issue.
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rights termination proceedings. The allegations often arise in
custody and divorce proceedings. The increase in litigation
has also brought to the criminal justice system a new type of
problem. At the forefront of this litigation is the most highly
publicized and controversial case2" Morgan v. Foretich."7 In
Morgan, the child victim Hilary was born to Dr. Elizabeth
Morgan and Dr. Eric Foretich after they had separated."'
Two years later, Dr. Morgan was awarded custody of Hilary
while Dr. Foretich received liberal visitation privileges.75 Soon
afterwards, Dr. Morgan began to suspect that Hilary was being
sexually abused because she began making inappropriate
statements regarding sexual encounters.7 Upon visiting a
child sexual abuse specialist, Dr. Morgan was convinced that
Hilary was being abused and commenced an action to have
Dr. Foretich's visitation rights terminated." Although
visitation was not terminated, accusations by Dr. Morgan
continued against Dr. Foretich. Dr. Foretich filed motions to
have Dr. Morgan held in contempt, alleging noncompliance
with his court-ordered visitation privileges. The trial court
found that although evidence existed which caused hesitation,
child sexual abuse was not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence." In subsequent litigation, Dr. Morgan was held in
contempt for not allowing Dr. Foretich to visit with Hilary.'
Dr. Morgan was incarcerated"' because she did not justify her
272. Girl in Custody Case Emerges in New Zealand, N.Y.Times, Feb. 24, 1990, at A9,
col. 4 [hereinafter Girl in Custody].
273. 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988).
274. 521 A.2d 248, 249 (App. D.C. 1987).
275. Id.
276. Morgan, 846 F.2d at 942.
277. Id. at 942-43.
278. Morgan, 521 A.2d at 249.
279. Morgan, 528 A.2d at 429.
280. Various issues were presented in the Morgan litigation.
281. Dr. Morgan was held in prison for 25 months for contempt of court. She was
released in September, 1989, after President Bush signed a law limiting incarceration to 12
months in District of Columbia child abuse cases. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1990, at A9, col. 4,
6. The bill provides that:
In any proceeding for custody of a minor child conducted in the Family
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actions or have a valid excuse for keeping Hilary from visiting
with her father.'
To protect Hilary from her.father, Dr. Morgan has kept
Hilary in hiding since August, 1987.' However, she was
recently located with her grandparents in Christchurch, New
Zealand.' For three years, they concealed Hilary's identity
and remained on the run.' After she was located in New
Zealand, Dr. Foretich immediately petitioned the New
Zealand Family Court Judge for custody.' However, the
Family Court Judge, G. T. Mahon, is not bound to follow the
orders of the United States Courts.27 New Zealand did not
sign the Hague Convention which allows one country to
enforce the orders of another.' Thus, Judge Mahon is only
bound by his determination of Hilary's best interests.' 9
Judge Mahon has begun the process of Hilary's
evaluation by ordering psychological examinations.' Isabel
Division of the Superior Court under paragraph (1) or (4) of section 11-
11-1, no individual may be imprisoned for civil contemp for more than
12 months (except as provided in paragraph (2)), pursuant to the
contempt power described in subsection (a), for disobedience of anorder
or for contempt committed in the presence of the court. This limitation
does not apply to imprisonment for criminal contempt or for any other
criminal violation.
Pub. L. No. 101-97, 103 Star. 633 (1989).
282. Morgan, 528 A.2d at 428.
283. Girl in Custody, supra note 272, at A9, col. 4.
284. Id. Her grandparents, William and Antonia Morgan, Are both psychologists. Efforts
Grow to Shield Girl in Custody Battle, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A9, col. 2. During a 31
month period, they lived on three continents. Id.
285. Id.
286. Child's 15,000-Mile Odyssey In a Troubling Custody Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990,
at A22, col. 5. Dr. Foretich traced Hilary to New Zealand when he was interviewed in
London, England in a program involving child custody cases. Id. During the program,
Hilary's picture was shown and a parent recognized Hilary. Id. at col. 6.
287. Id. at col. 5.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Girl in Custody, supra note 272, at col. 5. 'In the interim, custody has been awarded
to the grandparents. Efforts Grow to Shield Girl, supra note 284, at col. 4. Mary Froning,
the psychologist who interviewed Hilary two and one half years prior to her disappearance,
stated that the award "[o]f interim custody to the grandparents 'was a signal to me that the
courts were going to listen to Hilary and determine what to do based on her wishes."' Id.
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Mitchell, the court-appointed attorney for Hilary who has
expertise in investigating child sexual abuse,21 stated that "[t]he
idea is to protect this child from intensive interviews and
putting her through the hoops about 500 times; its just not
necessary."'
New Zealand custody laws do not allow the child to
appear in court during the court hearings.' If the child is
needed to testify and sexual abuse is suspected, the interview
between a court-appointed expert psychiatrist and the child is
videotaped.' The expert's report may be given to the
attorneys, but the court has the power to prevent the parties
from seeing the actual written report.' The court proceedings
are highly confidential and no one outside of the attorneys
and the parties will know when the actual case occurs.' Any
breach of this confidentiality is subject to punishment of a
three month jail term and a fine.' There is no doubt that
the New Zealand Family Court is concerned about Hilary's
welfare and will act in her best interests.
This case has received nationwide attention for various
reasons.' The parties in this action are prominent individuals.
In accordance with other related myths about child sexual
abuse, many have a tendency. to believe that child sexual
abuse cannot occur in middle and upper class families.
291. Id.
292. Efforts Grow to Shield Girl supra note 284, at col. 1.




297. Id. The New Zealand Family Court is going to great efforts to keep the media
within the guidelines of the strict regulations. Id. Concern definitely exists for Hilary's well-
being and as Isabel Mitchell stated, "I think it's patently absurd to think it could be in the
best interests of the child [to allow any interviews with Hilary]." Id.
298. The custody battle has gained national attention. Supporters of Dr.
Morgan have portrayed her as a mother going to any length necessary to
insure the welfare of her child, while Dr. Foretich's partisans have
portrayed him as the victim of a vindictive former wife who is using the
most heinous available charge against him.
Girl in Custody, supra note 272, col. 6.
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Morgan represents the reality of this heinous crime by showing
that the possibility of abuse does indeed cut across all social
and class status lines. Additionally, what was originally
commenced as a child sexual abuse case actually contains
several different, viable issues. On appeal after appeal,
litigation has focused on charges of civil contempt of court,
the right to a public hearing, due process rights and the
credibility of expert witness testimony. Morgan is also
representative of the actions that mothers are now willing to
take to protect their children as a result of the lack of
response they have been met with in the judicial system.'
Dr. Morgan is not alone in her fight against the system.
Many mothers across the United States refuse to consent to
have their children turned over for continued visitation with
their fathers when they are convinced that sexual abuse has
occurred. The basic scenario remains the same. The parents
are in the process of getting a divorce, are divorced or
separated. The mother usually retains custody while the
father is granted visitation rights with the child/children. In
various ways, the child displays evidence that he/she is being
sexually abused. The mother brings an action to have the
father's visitation privileges terminated. The court denies the
request and usually the abuse continues. Faced with the
nightmare of having her child/children continuously abused, the
mother enters a haven now called the "new underground
299. Rather than comply with Judge Herbert Dixon's order (of the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia), which required Dr. Morgan to produce Hilary for unsupervised visits
with Dr. Foretich, Dr. Morgan spent 25 months in jail until she was released under
Congressional legislation. Child's 15,000-Mile Odyssey, supra note 286, at col. 1.
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railroad."'  The mothers choose to remain "on the run" with
their children and risk possible imprisonment to protect them
from an unjust system.
The primary question to be addressed is whether
something has gone wrong within the system. Richard Ducote,
an attorney who specializes in child sexual abuse allegations,
labels what has occurred during litigation as the "backfire
syndrome."'" The courts turn against the mother and feel she
is paranoid despite adequate proof of abuse.' As Ducote
stated, "[i]t's easier to see the mother as hysterical and
manipulative than to accept the fact that a parent is sexually
assaulting his child."'
Generally, abuse is a ground upon which parental rights
may be terminated. 4  In most states, two hearings are held
prior to deciding whether to terminate parental rights.' The
fact finding hearing usually establishes whether abuse and/or
neglect has occurred by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.' Then, using a clear and convincing evidentiary
standard, a dispositional hearing determines whether the
parent's rights should be completely severed.'
300. Jacobbi & Wright, Mothers Who Go To Jail For Their Children, Good
Housekeeping, Oct. 1988, at 158. "Sanctuary organizations estimate that there are as many
as 200 women and children on the run in this country. These women have left behind their
homes, their families, their jobs, and usually, their real identities." Id. at 236.
April Curtis and her daughter have spent the last couple of years on the run. Id.
Fighting in court for almost two years, she was finally told that there was not enough evidence
to prove the allegations of sexual abuse, despite reports stating that her daughter Amanda had
"contracted sexually transmitted genital warts." Id. Even with a federal warrant out for April
Curtis' arrest, April's new husband echo's her belief by stating "it is a thousand times better
than having Amanda abused." Id.
301. Id. at 237.
302. Id.
303. Id. Ducote's partial solution of this problem is to educate the judgesfjustices. Id.
at 238.
304. Due Process and the Temination of Parental Rights, 19 FAM. L. Q. 245, 282-85
(1985-86) [hereinafter Due Process].
305. Id. at 282 n.292.
306. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
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The new standard evinced under Santosky' will not
add any weight to either side of the balance between the
state's parens patriae interesto or to the administrative interest
in reducing the costs of such proceedings3t while safeguarding
the defendant's rights. The prosecution often has a difficult
time proving the abuse by a fair preponderance of the
evidence because the evidence usually consists of the child
victim's out-of-court statements which constitute inadmissible,
or at least troublesome, hearsay. Raising the standard of
proof for termination proceedings, however, will not lower the
total number of proceedings31' and will result in higher costs
for the court system.12 These costs include lawyers' fees to
continue with the termination hearing, court costs, and possibly
the fees for expert witnesses. To this end, the fair
preponderance standard is an adequate measure by which to
determine whether parental rights should be terminated and
sufficiently protects both the child's interests as well as the
parent's procedural rights.
If the prosecution has proven sexual abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence, the verdict should
automatically terminate the father's contacts with the child.
A finding of sexual abuse without this per se denial is akin to
no finding at all. Without denying visitation, the sexual abuse
in many cases will continue, along with the danger of further
psychological trauma to the child.
Use of the fair preponderance standard also begs
legislative reforms in the area of hearsay exceptions to
facilitate findings of abuse during fact finding hearings.313
308. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982); See supra notes 266-70 and
accompanying text.
309. The interest is preserving and promoting the child's welfare. Santosky, 455 U.S. at
766.
310. Id.
311. Note, In Whose Best Interest?: Balancing the Need for Child Protection with the
Parental Right in Due Process in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 5 PROB. LJ. 213,
224 (1983).
312. Id.
313. Due Process, supra note 304, at 293.
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Without this vital, initial stage, many allegations of sexual
abuse will not be provable and, consequently, the dispositional
hearing regarding visitation, if it is necessary, will never be
held. In essence, each element of the system will determine
whether termination proceedings will be initiated and whether
the parent's rights will be terminated.
Finally, judges not within the family court system should
be educated in the area of child sexual abuse. Too frequently,
judges are exposed to this area of family law during their first
child sexual abuse case. Understanding the nature of the
abuse goes hand in hand with rendering a sound, well-
informed decision. Without this necessary foundation courts
are severely handicapped.
V. CONCLUSION
The heinous crime of child sexual abuse has infected
our society for hundreds of years and must now be halted by
the full force of the justice system. Although the American
public has finally acknowledged one of the worst "best kept
secrets," similar acknowledgement by the courts and
government is long overdue.314
Sexual abuse is unique in some respects because there
are few physical signs of the abuse. Most incidents involve
fondling, sexual contact, masturbation, and oral copulation.
Many of the victims are very young, sometimes infants. The
offenders are usually fathers or step-fathers, and in a few
cases very close relatives. Usually, the abuse does not occur
in one isolated incident, but continues over a period of time
that eventually destroys the child's life. Thus, children are
314. If ever a topic came to national consciousness overnight, this is certainly
it. The newspapers, the popular journals, all the media are full of the
topic: of mothers jailed because of the protest, of children emotionally
batteed by injury which is as terrible as it is difficult to detect.
23 FAMILY L.Q., Fall 1989, preface v-vi. See also VJ. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS
CRYING 95-99 (1973). See generally DZIECH & SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL: AMERICA'S COURTS
AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (1989).
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reluctant to disclose to anyone exactly what has happened,
confusion clouds their minds because the abuse has been
inflicted by a parent whom they love, and the perpetrator has
often threatened the child.
When the abuse is discovered and allegations are made
against the father, the victim is exposed to a double dose of
abuse. Outside of the victim's testimony, the prosecution has
little evidence to base a case on because normally no eye
witnesses are present.31 The child is exposed to the trauma
of testifying in unfamiliar and intimidating surroundings (often
more than once) and confronting his/her offender.316 If the
child is unavailable or unable to testify, hearsay statements
must meet high standards of reliability prior to their admission
into evidence.317 While the hearsay exceptions have provided
for some flexibility and have generally made it much easier
to prosecute sex abuse offenders, many areas still need to be
improved to assure their maximum effectiveness.
In fashioning such rules and guidelines, the best
interests of the children should be paramount. Additionally,
the standards should be tailored to disallow an over
abundance of judicial discretion. States without hearsay
exceptions should take the initiative to enact such statutes as
soon as possible. While this may not be accomplished
overnight, lobbyists, child sexual abuse support groups, and
various other organizations and agencies should recognize the
need and speak out to their representative legislators. Until
this is accomplished, child sexual abuse will continue to be
ineptly handled by the courts.
Following are suggested reforms in the area of child
315. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanyuing text. "The mere fact that a child is to be
called as a witness does not mean that she has to take the witness stand in open court.
Judges have done everything from allowing a full examination in open court to informally
discussing the case with the child in chambers." Gallet, supra note 2, at 485. Due to the
destructive nature of the overall trial, one judge in the New York City Family Court permits
settlement conferences before and during a child sexual abuse trial. Id. at 479. They occur
in the context of child protective proceedings. Id.
317. See supra notes 66 and accompanying text.
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sexual abuse which will hopefully be enacted in the future.
While some may view these reforms as unworkable, they are
nevertheless realistic when one considers the realm of child
sexual abuse.
NEW STANDARDS
1. Per se denial of all visitation rights upon a finding of
sexual abuse, or,
2. On appeals regarding the termination of parental
rights, shift the burden to the defendant father to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that his visitation rights should
be reinstated.
REVISION OF OLD STANDARDS
(If the above are not adopted)
1. Shift the burden of proof during the termination
hearing to require the defendant father to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, why his parental rights should be
maintained, or (if the above is not adopted),
2. If a separate hearing is required to determine whether
the father's visitation rights should be terminated, the standard
the prosecution must meet should be by a preponderance of
the evidence.
3. If the child is available as a witness, only require
him/her to testify one time at the initial abuse proceeding.
Establish an accurate and complete record which can be used
if further proceedings become necessary (videotape). This
would avoid subjecting the child to the trauma of the
additional courtroom experience.
4. Adopt federal and state rules mandating the use of
videotapes or two-way videos at all times to record the child's
testimony during the initial hearing. The child should never
be allowed in person at the court hearings. This would still
enable the judge as well as the parties involved, to observe
the demeanor of the witness without forcing the victim to




1. Adopt uniform federal hearsay statutes governing the
admission of childrens' out-of-court statements.
2. Under the statute, establish the types of corroboration
needed and specific time limitations on the admission of
excited utterances.
3. Establish state statutory uniform "age definitions" of a
child.
Kada-Dee Clark
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See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1988); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1
(1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072 (Vernon
1988); Vt. R. EVID. 804(a).
ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Supp. 1988) provides:
(a) In a prosecution for an offense under AS
11.41.410, 11.41.440 or 11.41.455, hearsay
evidence of a statement related to the offense,
not otherwise admissible, made by a child who
is the victim of the offense may be admitted into
evidence before the grand jury if
(1) the circumstances of the
statement indicate its reliability;
(2) the child is under 10 years of
age when the hearsay evidence is
sought to be admitted;
(3) additional evidence is
introduced to corroborate the
statement; and
(4) the child testifies at the grand
jury proceeding or the child will be
available to testify at trial.
(b) In this section "statement" means an oral or
written assertion or nonverbal conduct if the
nonverbal conduct is intended as an assertion
(Sec. 1 ch. 41 SLA 1985).
Id. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989) provides:
A. Except as otherwise provided in title 8, a
statement made by a minor who is under the age
of ten years describing any sexual offense or
physical abuse performed with, on or witnessed
by the minor, which is not otherwise admissible
by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence




1. The court finds, in an in camera
hearing, that the time, content and
circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient indicia of
reliability.
2. Either of the following is true:
(a) The minor testifies at the
proceedings.
(b) The minor is unavailable as a
witness, provided that if the minor
is unavailable as a witness, the
statement may be admitted only if
there is corroborative evidence of
the statement.
B. A statement shall not be admitted under this
section unless the proponent of the statement
makes known to the adverse party his intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement sufficiently in advance of the
proceedings to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
Id. ARK. R. EVID. 803(25)(A) (Supp. 1989) provides:
(25)(A) A statement made by a child under ten
(10) years of age concerning any act or offense
against that child involving sexual offenses, child
abuse or incest is admissible in any criminal
proceeding in a court of this State, provided:
(1) The Court finds, in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of
the jury, that the statement offered
possesses a reasonable likelihood of
trustworthiness using the following
criteria:
a. the age of the child
b. the maturity of the child
c. the time of the statement
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d. the content of the statement
e. the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the statement
f. the nature of the offense involved
g. the duration of the offense
involved
h. the relationship of the child to
the offender
i. the reliability of the assertion
j. the reliability-credibility of the
child witness before the Judge
k. the relationship or status of the
child to the one offering the
statement
1. any other corroborative
evidence of the act which is the
subject of the statement
m. any other factor which the
Court at the time and under the
circumstances deems relevant and
appropriate.
(2) The proponent of the statement
shall give the adverse party
reasonable notice of his intention
to offer the statement and the
particulars of the statement.
(3) If a statement is admitted
pursuant to this Section the Court
shall instruct the jury that it is for
the jury to determine the weight
and credit to be given the
statement and that, in making the
determination, it shall consider the
age and maturity of the child, the
nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the




(4) This Section shall not be
construed to limit the admission of
an offered statement under any
other hearsay exception or
applicable Rule of Evidence.
Id. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3), (5) (Supp. 1989) provides:
(3) Out-of-court statements made by a child
describing any act of sexual contact, intrusion, or
penetration, as defined in section 18-3-401,
performed with, by, or on the child declarant, not
otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule
which provides an exception to the objection of
hearsay, may be admissible in any proceeding in
which the child is a victim of an unlawful sexual
offense pursuant to the provisions of section 13-
25-129, C.R.S.
(5) The statutory privilege between the husband
and the wife shall not be available for excluding
or refusing testimony in any prosecution of an
unlawful sexual offense.
Id. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1989)
provides:
(a) In a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated
upon a child under the age of 13, including but
not limited to prosecutions for violations of
Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal
Code of 1961, the following evidence shall be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by such child of an
out of court statement made by
such child that he or she
complained of such act to another;
and
(2) testimony of an out of court
statement made by such child
describing any complaint of such act
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or matter or detail pertaining to
any act which is an element of an
offense which is the subject of a
prosecution for a sexual act
perpetrated upon a child.
(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of
the jury that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(A) Testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) Is unavailable as a witness and
there is corroborative evidence of
the act which is the subject matter
of the statement.
(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this
Section, the court shall instruct the jury that it is
for the jury to determine the weight and
credibility to be given the statement and that, in
making the determination, it shall consider the
age and maturity of the child, the nature of the
statement, the circumstamces under which the
statement was made, and any other relevant
factor.
(d) The proponent of the statement shall give
the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of the statement. Laws 1963, p. 2836,
§ 115-9, added by P.A. 82-782, § 1, eff. Jan. 1,
1983. Renumbered § 115-10 and amended by
P.A. 82-1057, Art. II, § 7, eff. Feb. 11, 1983.
Amended by P.A. 83-1067, § 3, eff. July 1, 1984;
P.A. 85-837, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988. Paragraphs 12-
13 through 12-16 of this chapter.
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Id. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(5)(6) (West Supp. 1989)
provides:
(5) Neither the privilege attaching to confidential
communications between a health practitioner or
mental health professional and patient nor the
prohibition upon admissibility of communications
between husband and wife shall be ground for
excluding evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.
(6) A report, study, record, or other writing or
an audiotape or videotape recording made by the
department of human services, a juvenile court
officer, a peace officer or a hospital relating to
a child in a proceeding under this division is
admissible not withstanding any objection to
hearsay statements contained in it provided it is
relevant and material and provided its probative
value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice to the child's parent, guardian, or
custodian. The circumstances of the making of
the report, study, or record or other writing or
an audiotape or videotape recording, including
the maker's lack of personal knowledge, may be
proved to affect its weight.
Id. MINN. STAT. ANNOT. § 595.02(3) (West 1988) provides:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under
the age of ten years or a person who is mentally
impaired as defined in section 609.341,
subdivision 6, alleging, explaining, denying, or
describing any act of sexual contact or
penetration performed with or on the child or
any act of physical abuse of the child or the
person who is mentally impaired by another, not
otherwise admissible by statute or rule of
evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence if:
(a) the court or person authorized
to receive evidence finds, in a
hearing conducted outside of the
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presence of the jury, that the time,
content, and circumstances of the
statement and the reliability of the
person to whom the statement is
made provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(b) the child or person mentally
impaired as defined in Section
609.341, subdivision 6, either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and
there is corroborative evidence of
the act; and
(c) the proponent of the statement
notifies the adverse party of the
proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of the
statement sufficiently in advance of
the proceeding at which the
proponent intends to offer the
statement into evidence to provide
the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
For purposes of this subdivision, an
out-of-court statement includes
video, audio, or other recorded
statements. An unavailable
witness includes an incompetent
witness.
Id. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides:
1. A statement made by a child under the age
of twelve relating to an offense under chapter
565, 566 or 568, RSMo, performed with or on a
child by another, not otherwise admissible by
statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in
criminal proceedings in the courts of this state as
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substantive evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of
the jury that the time, content and
circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness.
2. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section
or any provision of law or rule of evidence
requiring corroboration of statements, admissions
or confessions of the defendant, and
notwithstanding any prohibition of hearsay
evidence, a statement by a child when under the
age of twelve who is alleged to be a victim of an
offense under chapter 565, 566 or 568, RSMo, is
sufficient corroboration of a statement, admission
or confession regardless of whether or not the
child is available to testify regarding the offense.
3. A statement may not be admitted under this
section unless the prosecuting attorney makes
known to the accused or his counsel his intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement sufficiently in advance of the
proceedings to provide the accused or his counsel
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the admissibility of statements, admissions
or confessions otherwise admissible by law.
Id. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.385 (1987) provides:
Admissibility; notice of unavailability or inability
of child to testify.
1. In addition to any other provision for
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admissibility made by statute or rule of court, a
statement made by a child under the age of 10
years describing any act of sexual conduct
performed with or on the child is admissible in
a criminal proceeding regarding that sexual
conduct if the:
(a) Court finds, in a hearing out
of the presence of the jury, that the
time, content and circumstances of
the statement provide sufficient
circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness; and
(b) Child either testifies at the
proceeding or is unavailable or
unable to testify.
(2) If the child is unavailable or unable to testify,
written notice must be given to the defendant at
least 10 days before the trial of the prosecution's
intention to offer the statement in evidence.
Id. R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (Supp. 1988) provides:
Hearsay permitted. - In any custody and/or
termination trial where a petition has been filed
by the department for children and their families
in accordance with §§ 14-1-11, 40-11-7 and/or 15-
7-7 in the family court, the court may, in its
discretion, permit as evidence any statement by
a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old
about a prescribed act of abuse, neglect or
misconduct by a parent or guardian, if such
statement was made spontaneously within a
reasonable time after the act is alleged to have
occurred, and if the statement was made to
someone the child would normally turn to for
sympathy, protection or advice.
Id. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987) provides:
A statement made by a child under the age of
ten describing any act of sexual contact or rape
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performed with or on the child by another, not
otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is
admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings
against the defendant or in any proceeding under
chapter 26-8 in the courts of this state if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing
conducted outside the presence of
the jury, that the time, content and
circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:.
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness.
However, if the child is unavailable
as a witness, such statement may be
admitted only if there is
corroborative evidence of the act.
No statement may be
admitted under this section unless
the proponent of the statement
makes known his intention to offer
the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and
address of the declarant to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
Id. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (Supp. 1989) which provides:
A statement made by a child under the age of
14 years describing any act of sexual contact or
physical abuse performed with or on the child by
another is admissible in evidence by the
testimony of the person or persons to whom
made if the child is available to testify in the
1990]
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proceedings and the court finds that the
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
indicia of reliability. (Code 1981, § 24-3-16,
enacted by GA. L. 1986, p. 668, § 1.)
